Full text of "Notes on field artillery for officers of all arms"

See other formats

This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project
to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject
to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books
are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the
publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the
public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to
prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ Make non-commercial use of the files We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for
personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ Refrain from automated querying Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine
translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the
use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ Maintain attribution The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find
additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ Keep it legal Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just
because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other
countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of
any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner
anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers
discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web

at |http : //books . google . com/

Z^ i^ -g ^t mm^ ^^j 0^ f^Wl^w^ ^^

400

^Mr>e

(

kvH

/^<r''.

->v^

NOTES

Field Artillery

OFFICERS OF ALL ARMS.

By OLIVER LrjiSPAULDING, Jr.,

Captain Fifth Field Artillery, United States Army.

FUBIilSHBD BY THE

U. 8. CAVALRY ASSOCIATION.

i9oa

PBBSS OP KBTOUBSON PRINTING CO.,
liBAVBNWORTH, K'ANSAS.

PREFACE,

<^^

-f

'^^ This little book is an expansion and rearrangement of a course

^^- of lectures given by me in the United States Infantry and Cavalry

'^ School, and has been prepared for publication in its present form at

^ the suggestion of Major John F. Morrison, General Staff, Senior In-

^ structor Department of Military Art, Army Service Schools. Pos-

sibly it may help, in a small way, to interest oflScers of other arms
^^. in Field Artillery, and thus strengthen the feeling of unity through-

out the service.

The books to which I have most frequently referred in collect-
"^ ing material are the following :

Rouquerol : "The Tactical Handling of Quick-Firing Field

Artillery."
May: "Field Artillery with the Other Arms."
Hohenlohe : " Letters on Artillery."
Rohne: "Die Taktik der Feldartillerie fiir.die Offiziere aller

Waffen."
Langlois : " L'artillerie de Campagne en Liaison avec les autres

Armes."
Culmann : " Le Canon ^ Tir Rapide dans la Bataille."
^ Layriz : " Moderne Feldartillerie."

Drill regulations, official and semi-official manuals of our own

and other armies.
Reports of American observers in Manchuria.
-v-._ . Journal of the United States Artillery.

...3 Rouquerol's and May's books are particularly recommended to

5^ those who care to read more on the subject.

5 Among the officers who have rendered me assistance, I wish

.J, ^ to express especial obligation to Captain Dwight E. Aultman, Fifth

Field Artillery, and Captain Arthur L. Conger, Twenty-ninth In-
fantry, who have aided me by advice and criticism during the whole
time that the manuscript was in preparation.

OLIVER LYMAN SPAULDING, Jr.,
Captain Fifth Field Artillery,

ri Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,

'7 June, 1908.

IS-i^^^

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.
Introduction; General Characteristics of Field Artillery.

CHAPTER II.
Classification and Organization.

CHAPTER III.
Materiel.

CHAPTER IV.
Methods of Fire; Conduct of Fire; Fire Direction.

CHAPTER V.
Drill Regulations; Information and Communication.

CHAPTER VI.

Tactics.

CHAPTER VII.
Examples of Mankuver and Firing Problems.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FIELD ARTILLERY.

Artillery, although often spoken of as a thing
apart from the other arms, is really the one of all
the arms which is least capable of such consideration.
Infantry can, in many cases, be sufficient unto itself;
cavalry, although generally an auxiliary to the infan-
try, can act independently. But artillery, while it is
a powerful assistant to either of the other arms, is
nothing by itself. Even the famous charge of Seid-
litz*s cavalry, upon the head of the allied column at
Rossbach, could not have been made without the
help of the eighteen twelve pounders which Freder-
ick placed on the Janusberg ; but it was Seidlitz that
struck the blow — the artillery was powerless to do
more than give him the opening.

An infantry or independent cavalry force is
usually commanded by an infantry or cavalry officer.
Artillery, from the very nature of things, is almost
invariably under the command of an officer of another
arm. Therefore, for the good of the service at large,
it is important that officers of the other arms study
the characteristics of artillery.

There are plenty of books intended to teach the
artillerist his own business, just as there are plenty
of books doing the same for the infantryman or

cavalryman. And since field artillery always acts as
an auxiliary, the artilleryman can get what he needs
to insure intelligent cooperation out of the ordinary
text books of the other arms.

But when the infantryman or the cavalryman, who
has to command or serve in a mixed force containing
artillery, wants to find out how he may get the most
good out of his guns, he finds himself in difficulties.
The information that he wants is not collected; to
understand one book, he is compelled constantly to
refer to half a dozen others. Too often he gets the
idea that the handling of a battery is a mystery, a
highly technical matter, and decides that the best thing
he can do is to let the gunner alone, to go his own
mysterious way.

It is not that the power of artillery is underrated.
In fact, powers are very often attributed to it which
it does not claim, and does not possess; missions are
then assigned to it which it is incapable of perform-
ing, and disappointment shown when it fails.

This arm differs from the others, in the first place,
in that it is capable of fire action only. The artillery,
man is proud to remember Captain Norman Ramsey's
horse battery at Fuentes de Onoro, which, being cut
off by French cavalry, limbered up and charged, and
so forced its way back to its friends ; but he does not
claim that it was artillery work. The Prussian horse
artillery used to practice, in time of peace, a charge
by the mounted detachments, to permit a withdrawal
of the guns from imminent danger; but the sugges-
tion provokes only a smile now.

Being thus debarred from shock action, artillery
has, as was its clear duty, sought to develop its fire
power to the utmost. In so doing it has naturally

evolved a materiel and a system for using it, which
by comparison seem complicated. But most of the
complications are for the artilleryman himself to deal
with; others need consider them only in so far as it
is necessary to enable them to appreciate the tactical
powers and limitations of the arm.

But a certain amount of this technical information
every officer should have ; otherwise he will make one
of two mistakes. He will so hamper his artillery
with unwise or impossible orders that its energy is
wasted; or he will leave his artillery commander to
his own devices, without even giving him information
which would enable him to act intelligently.

There was a time when the artillery jealously
guarded its technical information, and did not want
to be understood. Up to the middle of the last cen-
tury, an officer joining the Prussian artillery was
required to promise not to betray the secrets of the
corps. Hohenlohe remarks:

"But he learned no secrets at all, and as on the
other hand he was not told that what he learned was
not a secret, he never knew whether he was not
divulging secrets whenever he spoke about his
arm, and he gladly stopped all conversation on the
subject by saying that these were technical things
about which he was not at liberty to speak. ^ ^ ^
The gunner was very much afraid of betraying
secrets ; but how could he betray them when he did
not know any ? I can assure you of this at least, that
I myself never learned one. Ah ! I am afraid that,
by saying this, I have betrayed to you the very
greatest secret of all."

But this spirit, happily, has long been a thing of
the past. Artillerymen understand that, as they can
do nothing alone, it is to their advantage to associate
themselves as closely as possible with the other arms.
This book, then, will seek to collect the most essen-
tial technical information, and make a few tactical
applications of it.

Early artillery weapons sought to increase fire
effect by increasing the size and weight of the indi-
vidual projectile — the round shot. Besides being in
itself more powerful than a musket ball, and so pos-
sessing great battering power, this projectile was cap-
able of producing effect on a very deep target, by
means of its adaptability to ricochet fire.

The next step was to get distribution in breadth,
by means of grape shot. This could be used only at
very close range, but gave then an almost annihilat-
ing effect. The single shot, whose power was more
than sufficient against animate targets, was broken
up into a great number of smaller ones, each power-
ful enough for its purpose, and these smaller projec-
tiles distributed with fair uniformity over a consider-
able area.

We thus find that the two important characteris-
tics of artillery fire were recognized at an early day,
— battering power, and the ability to sweep an area.
Later improvements have simply developed these two
kinds of fire.

The round shot as a battering projectile has now
been superseded by the shell. This is simply a fly-
ing mine ; as heavy a charge as possible of high ex-
plosive is confined in a steel envelope only strong
enough to bear the shock of discharge with safety,
and provided with a percussion fuze which will deto-

nate it on striking a resisting target. In some such
projectiles a delay-action fuze is used, which retards
the explosion long enough for the shell to penetrate
or bury itself in the target.

Another type of shell is made with thicker walls,
and hence a smaller bursting charge. This is in-
tended to be burst in the air at a certain point of its
trajectory, by means of a time fuze, so scattering
fragments of considerable size, and giving an effect
similar to that of grape shot, but at a longer range.

This brings us to the shrapnel, which is now the
principal field artillery projectile. This differs from
the second type of shell, in that the envelope is thin,
and the bursting charge ver)r small ; the extra space
is filled with bullets. Thus it is nothing but a very
efficient device for transferring a grape or canister
effect to a long range.

The power of shrapnel fire, then, is due entirely
to its ability to cover a considerable area. Hence, it
should never be attempted to use such a projectile in
single shots against a small target. Its effect is com-
parable, not to that of a rifle, but to that of a number
of rifles controlled by one commander.

Shrapnel fire is, essentially, identically the same
thing as collective rifle fire, but generated in a pecu-
liar manner and capable of special applications.

To get the proper benefit out of this characteristic,
the area covered must be made of dimensions suited
to the occasion. This compels the use of guns in
groups of various sizes ; as Hohenlohe strikingly says,
•* A single gun is no gun at all."

In the early days of artillery it was customary to
assign the lighter guns, singly or in pairs, to infantry
battalions; but we find instances of massing them

more and more frequently, until, about the beginning
of the nineteenth century, the battalion gun disap-
peared.

At the battle of Marignano ( 1 5 1 5 ) all the French
guns were massed to sweep the line of the Swiss ad-
vance. The Chevalier Bayard is reported to have
said to the Grand Master of the Artillery, "I pray
you fire seven or eight guns all together;'* which was
done, with great effect.

Gustavus Adolphus improved his light guns
greatly, increasing both their mobility and their rate
of fire. His heavy guns were grouped into large
batteries, and he often assembled the battalion guns
to reinforce or replace them.

Frederick the Great, in his earlier battles, paid
but little attention to . the artillery ; but when he
finally did begin to appreciate it he did much for its
improvement. He used his guns habitually in masses;
and he was the first to organize horse artillery, which
could keep pace with cavalry.

His enemies, too, the Austrians, had a most effi-
cient artillery at this time. Lichtenstein, their great
artillery general, followed the same plan as Frederick,
in habitually using his heavier guns in masses.

Napoleon, himself an artillery officer, placed great
reliance on this arm. He said, *'It is the artillery of
my Guard that decides most of my battles ; for having
it always at hand, I can use it wherever I wish." He
used his guns in imposing masses, with the most de-
cisive effect.

One of his brilliant artillery generals, S6narmont,
showed an audacity at Friedland that startled even
his master. He formed all the artillery of Victor's
corps, thirty-eight guns, into one battery, and advanced

with it boldly ahead of the French line to within 400
paces of the Russian infantry. Napoleon's first
thought was that S^narmont, with his whole command,
was deserting to the enemy; then, seeing the great
battery come into action, his feeling changed to one
of anxiety lest it be lost, and he sent an aide to recall
it. But S^narmont only replied, "Let me and my
gunners alone ; I will be responsible,*' and advanced
to 200 paces range. His fire drove the Russians from
the field ; he reports their loss as 4,000 killed, his
own as 1 1 killed and 45 wounded, and his ammuni-
tion expenditure as 2,516 rounds.

At Wagram, formidable French batteries took a
decisive part no less than four times. First, an Aus-
trian attack on Napoleon's right was checked, chiefly
by artillery fire, and Davout began to make headway
there. Next, the rest of the Austrian line coming
on, it was checked in the center by a line of 100 field
guns ; on the left it continued to gain ground until
it came under fire from the heavy guns in position
on the Lobau, when Massena managed to hold it.

Davout, meanwhile, had been pushing his flank
attack; and when Napoleon saw that this was suc-
ceeding, he advanced all along the line. Massena
made a counter attack on the left, where the troops
opposed to him were already shaken by the fire from
the Lobau ; and in the center the great battery of
100 guns advanced and opened the way for the deci-
sive charge of the day, which forced the enemy from
the field.

Napoleon's opponents wefe long in acquiring the
skill and boldness necessary to compete with his ar-
tillery. Even as late as 18 1 3, at the battle of Bautzen,
where the Allied artillery was used with great effect.

some of the Prussian captains hesitated to engage
their full force, and held a part of their eight-gun bat-
teries in reserve. But a little later in the same year,
at Leipzig, the Allied artillery was handled in a man-
ner that compelled Napoleon to admit that **at last
they had learned something.'*

In our own Civil War, we find most conspicuous
instances of the use of guns in mass. At Malvern
Hill, McClellan concentrated his batteries for defense,
and supported them by fire from the gunboats in the
James River. At Fredericksburg, Burnside crowned
all the hills on his side of the river with guns, to
cover his offensive movement.

At Gettysburg the guns were heavily massed on
both sides. Longstreet*s attack upon the Third Corps
at the Peach Orchard was prepared by 64 guns, and
most of this line advanced to support the successful
infantry. And the Confederate advance here was
checked largely by artillery — the fragments of the
Third Corps batteries, aided by batteries sent in from
the Second and Fifth Corps, and from the Artillery
Reserve.

On the last day of the battle, Pickett's charge was
supported by 75 guns of Longstreet's corps and 60 of
Hill's. The Federal position being cramped, an
equal force could not be gotten into action ; but all
for which room could be found, about 80, were as-
sembled to meet the attack.

In all the great battles of the Franco- Prussian
War, masses of guns played a leading part. But no
other achievement of the Prussian batteries could
compare with the terrible ** circle of fire" formed by
them at Sedan. Southwest of Sedan was one mass
of 114 guns; on the south, 36; on the east, 144; on

the northeast, 90; and on the northwest, 156. In all,
540 guns were in action, and 100 more were present,
but could not be used on account of lack of space.
Hohenlohe says that some of the batteries of the
Twelfth Corps came up to reinforce the Guard artil-
lery, and their commander took it as a personal insult
when he was informed that there was no room for
him.

In Manchuria the great lines of guns of former
wars did not appear ; the same result was obtained
in another way. The fire was concentrated upon the
selected point from widely separated positions. Thus,
at Liaoyang, the Japanese concentrated the fire of
over 200 guns on the Shushanpu position; but the
fire was converging, from a line 15,000 yards long —
a crescent over 10,000 yards from point to point.
Some 30 heavy guns were on the extreme right ; then
came three separate groups, each consisting of one
field artillery regiment, 36 guns ; and finally, on the
extreme left, were the two regiments of army reserve
field artillery.

Concentration of fire is what has always been
sought. Concentration of guns has been accepted as
a necessary evil. To get the first without the second
two things are necessary — long range, and means of
controlling fire from a distance. The range has
gradually been lengthened, but the necessary control
of fire was never attained until the field telephone
came. The principle is the same at Marignano and
at Liaoyang ; only the method is changed.

To sum up, we find that we have a powerful unit,
which is very small and compact, and hence particu-
larly susceptible of control. The range being long,
it is possible to produce an effect at will upon any

one of many targets, or to concentrate the fire of
widely separated groups upon one target. The guns
being capable of very rapid fire, this effect may be
made exceedingly intense.

Since it is unnecessary, with the present laying
instruments, that each gunner see the target at which
he is firing, the guns may, if desired, be entirely
concealed. They may thus get exceptional oppor-
tunites for acting by surprise, and it is very difiBcult
to reply effectively to their fire.

On account of the fixed support upon which the
guns rest, the accuracy of their fire is less affected
than that of the other arms by excitement and ner-
vousness of the men.

Loss of men has relatively little effect upon the
volume of artillery fire ; that is, if a gun has lost half
its cannoneers it has by no means lost half its fire
power. The ultimate unit is not the man, but the
gun; and the gun can remain in action as long as
there is a single man to serve it. Not only can^ but,
when necessary, does ; atColenso, when Colonel Long*s
two batteries were lost, several of the guns were
served to this extreme limit.

On the other hand, artillery naturally has "the
defects of its qualities.*' For example, it is, as has
been said, good for fire action only. It is useless,
helpless, and exceedingly vulnerable while in motion;
a gun with its team forms a target almost as large as
a platoon of cavalry in column, and even 'the loss of
a single horse causes confusion and delay. Its move-
ment is greatly affected by the terrain and the con-
dition of the roads, and the effectiveness of its fire
by weather, time of day, etc.

CHAPTER 11.

CLASSIFICATION AND ORGANIZATION OF FIELD
ARTILLERY.

In designing any gun intended for use in the
field, there are two important requirements — power
and mobility. Granting that a general type of gun
has been decided upon, it is evident that any increase
in one of these two factors is at the expense of the
other. It is necessary to balance the two, keeping in
mind the specific purpose of the gun under consider-
ation.

We thus find it necessary to have several distinct
classes of gun, ranging from the very powerful and
almost immobile to the very mobile but compara-
tively weak. The general classification is: — siege,
heavy field, light field, horse and mountain guns.

Besides this classification, based upon power, there
is a second, based upon the shape of the trajectory.

For the attack of targets that can be reached by
it, flat trajectory fire is preferred, on account of its
power and accuracy. Cases frequently arise, how-
ever, where such fire is useless, either the gun or its
target being so concealed and sheltered by entrench-
ments or the accidents of the terrain that higher
angles of departure or fall become necessary.

To provide for both cases, there must be two or
three types of weapon, — the long gun for flat tra-
jectory, the shorter howitzer for curved, and some-

times the still shorter mortar for high angle fire. We
thus subdivide our original classes, and distinguish,
for example, the light field howitzer, the heavy field
gun, the siege mortar, etc.

Evidently, the number of separate calibers that
might be adopted to make a complete series of types
is very large. But it is iiliportant to reduce this
number to a minimum, both from considerations of
economy and also to avoid complication in ammuni-
tion supply. Each army must determine, according
to the conditions which it has to meet, how many and
what calibers it should adopt.

The guns being selected, the quCvStion of organi-
zation arises. As has already been shown, a single
gun is rarely of any use ; we are thus brought to con-
sider, as our first step, how many guns should be in-
cluded in our smallest permanent unit.

This unit, called the battery, must be large enough
to utilize efficiently the properties of artillery fire
above indicated, but no larger. If it is smaller, our
organization has evidently failed at the outset ; the
unit will fail to do its work, and two or more will be
habitually consolidated. Each little unit, of course,
will have been provided with a complete set of the
necessary instruments, and placed under the com-
mand of an officer of appropriate rank and experi-
ence ; thus part of the officers and part of the instru-
ments will be wasted. On the other hand, if it is
larger than necessary, it will habitually be split up ;
then some of the subdivisions will be unprovided
with instruments, and some of them may have to be
entrusted to commanders whose knowledge and ex-
perience is inadequate.

It is al.so essential that the primary unit be of a
size which is conveniently handled, in action, in camp,
and on the march ; and it should include within itself
a number of caissons, suitably proportioned to its
number of guns, so as to insure a sufficient ammuni-
tion supply under all ordinary circumstances.

When the necessity of using guns collectively in-
stead of individually was first perceived, the first step
was simply to form masses of guns temporarily, when
and where they were needed, but to make no perma-
nent organization. The inconveniences of this were
apparent, and finally all armies adopted the plan of
forming permanent batteries. But for a long time
after this was done, it was not everywhere accepted,
as it now is, that all the pieces of a single battery
should be of the same type and caliber.

The number of guns in a battery has been grad-
ually reduced, as a result of experience and of changes
in materiel, from as many as twelve to as few as four.
Russia and Austria are now the only powers that
have batteries as large as eight guns.

In the nature of things, artillery must be prepared
to expend a large amount of ammunition, and with
the advent of rapid fire guns it has become necessary
to provide a larger amount than ever. This supply
is managed by assigning to the battery at least one
caisson per gun, and frequently by providing a light
ammunition column for certain groups of batteries,
linking them with the main ammunition columns of
the division, corps or army.

In our own service the organiziation of siege artil-
lery is made to conform to that of the lighter types.
In most countries, however, the siege organization
conforms more nearly to that of garrison or seacoast

artillery. Thus the Japanese used, in the late war,
some very heavy guns, even up to the 28 cm. (i i-inch)
seacoast howitzers mounted before Port Arthur.
These guns were manned by coast artillery troops ;
there was no fixed organization, but such pieces as
seemed suitable were selected from those available,
and the proper quota of men assigned to handle them.
Russia has organizations known as siege artillery
regiments, distinct and different from the field artil-
tillery ; each regiment is provided with a siege park
of different types of heavy pieces, from which the
ones suited to each occasion are selected.

In like manner, each army has minor differences
in classification, peculiar to itself. The light field
battery, however, is the predominant type everywhere;
it is armed with howitzers or guns, but usually with
the latter. In Germany, for example, the proportion
is one howitzer battery to three gun batteries.

As a basis for comparison, we may take the light
field battery armed with guns.

Our own battery consists of four guns and twelve
caissons; in addition it has a store wagon and forge,
constituting a small repair shop, and two kit wagons,
besides the allotted forage and ration wagons. The
ammunition carried amounts to 1,432 rounds, or 358
per gun. The battery is divided into four gun
sections, Nos. i to 4, each consisting of one gun and
one caisson; four caisson sections, Nos. 5 to 8, of two
caissons each; and a supernumerary or ninth section,
to which are assigned all the remaining vehicles. This
last section is commanded by the battery quarter-
master sergeant, the other sections by sergeants.
The first eight sections are organized into platoons of

two sections each, commanded by lieutenants. The
whole battery is commanded by a captain.

This organization is in general niuch the same
as that of a French battery, which has the same
number of guns and caissons, and carries 312 rounds
per gun.

We have preferred to keep a large supply of am-
munition with the battery itself. One reason for this
is doubtless that our total force is so small that we
seldom find many batteries together. When a large
number are assembled, it is easy to withdraw a certain
nunjber of caissons from each, if it is thought advis-
able, and organize a consolidated reserve of ammu.
nition. The German organization presupposes the
habitual concentration of batteries, and assumes that
such a consolidation would be the rule; it hence
provides for light ammunition columns, and assigns
fewer caissons to the batteries.

The German battery has six guns and six caissons;
it is intended to add three more caissons. Some
high authorities, notably General Rohne, are strongly
in favor of a four-gun battery, but apparently no
change is to be made at present. The number of
rounds of ammunition with the battery itself, after
the increase in the number of caissons, will be 168
per gun.

The Japanese organization is similar to the
German. The battery has six guns and six caissons;
the immediate ammunition supply is 130 rounds per
gun.

The batteries of most other armies resemble, in a
general way, either the French or German type.
One minor peculiarity is found in the English battery,
which is of six guns, but is commanded by a major

instead of a captain. A more marked deviation is
noted in the Russian field battery, already referred
to. This consists of eight guns and sixteen caissons,
is divided into two half batteries commanded by
captains, and is itself commanded by a lieutenant
colonel. The ammunition supply is 1,824 rounds, or
228 per gun. The Russian horse batteries have only
six guns.

In all countries larger units are formed by group-
ing two or three batteries. In our service this unit
is called the battalion ; it is commanded by a major,
whose commissioned staff consists of a captain as ad-
jutant, and a lieutenant as quartermaster and com-
missary. The number of batteries is always three.*

Foreign units next above the battery are :

France, — The g-roupe, of three field or two horse
batteries, commanded by a major.

Germany . — The abieilung, of the same organiza-
tion.

England. — The brigade, formerly called brigade
division, of the same strength, commanded by a lieu-
tenant colonel.

Japan, — The battalion, of three batteries, com-
manded by a major.

Russia, — The division, of three field or two horse
batteries, commanded by a colonel.

Most armies provide for at least one still higher
unit. England, however, has no permanent unit
larger than the brigade; and France, while she as-
sembles groupes into regiments in time of peace, for
administration and instruction, treats the groupe as
the unit in time of war.

Our own higher unit is the regiment. It consists
of two battalions; regimental headquarters are or-

ganized as in infantry or cavalry. The German and
Japanese regiments are formed in the same manner,
by combining two of the next smaller unit ; but since
the batteries are poorly supplied with ammunition,
each regiment hasj its own light ammunition column.
In Germany this regimental column consists of twenty-
one caissons, making the average supply of ammuni-
tion per gun in the whole regiment, counting
everything, 219 rounds. In Japan it consists of a
regimental reserve of twenty-seven caissons, and two
regimental columns made up of light carts. The total
supply per regiment is 350 rounds per gun.

In Russia the divisions are combined by twos or
threes into brigades, commanded by major generals.
Germany also" has brigades, of two regiments each,
organized in time of peace.

In assigning artillery to mixed bodies of troops,
it was formerly customary to give small numbers of
guns to infantry brigades, or^even to smaller units."
It is not now usual to make permanent assignments
to anything smaller than the infantry or cavalry di-
vision. Some armies give all the light guns to the
divisions; others retain a part of them under the
direct control of the corps or army commander.
Heavy guns are rarely assigned permanently to any
unit smaller than an army corps.

In the Civil War both sides began with an artil-
lery which had very little organization beyond the
battery. The batteries were assigned to infantry
brigades, or even in some cases to regiments, without
any fixed system.

The first attempt at organization, on the Federal
side, was by General McClellan when he took com-
mand of the Array of the Potomac. He assigned

four batteries to each division, one of the four being-
from the regular service ; the captain of the regular
battery was chief of the artillery of the division.
Later, during the Peninsular campaign, he directed
that each corps commander withdraw from each of
his divisions one half its batteries, and organize them
into a corps reserve. Besides this divisional and
corps artillery, he formed an army reserve of i8 bat-
teries and a separate siege train. The corps and
army ** reserves" were reserves only in name, and
generally were brought into action early.

As new divisions were organized, and artillery
had to be provided for them, the army reserve grad-
ually diminished in size, and finally became little
more than a central depot.

By 1863 the divisions had become greatly reduced
in strength, and* in most cases all the divisional artil-
lery was withdrawn and consolidated into a corps
artillery brigade. Thus in the Gettysburg campaign
each corps had its brigade of from four to eight
batteries ; the cavalry corps had two brigades, aggre-
gating nine batteries ; and the army reserve consisted
of 21 batteries, organized into five brigades. On
account of the lack of field officers most of the
brigades were commanded by captains.

The Confederates had a similar experience with
their artillery. In the Peninsula, their army reserve
artillery was organized into battalions of from three
to five batteries, and was all under one head; but in
only about half of the divisions was there any orga-
nization beyond the battery. In the others the indi-
vidual battery commanders reported directly to the
division or even the brigade commanders. Later in
.the war, the Confederates evolved a very good artil-

lery system, the unit being the battalion of from four
to six batteries. The corps artillery consisted of two
battalions under a chief; the divisional artillery of
one battalion. There was no army reserve.

Our present organization provides for assigning
all the light guns to the divisions. Each infantry
division is to have a brigade of two regiments of
light or mountain artillery, making 48 guns, or about
3^ per thousand infantry; each cavalry division,
one regiment of horse artillery. We have as yet no
light field howitzers ; but doubtless when it becomes
possible some of the divisional batteries will be
armed with them.

Germany also now assigns all the light guns to
the divisions, giving a brigade of two regiments, 72
guns, to each infantry division. This gives 144 guns
to the corps (2 divisions, 25,000 infantry), or 5^ guns
per thousand, besides whatever heavy guns are
assigned to corps headquarters, usually four batteries.
One abteilung in each corps is armed with light howit-
zers. A cavalry division, 3,600 sabers, has a horse
abteilung of two batteries.

The same system of distribution is followed in
Russia. The first division of each corps has an artil-
lery brigade of two divisions, making six batteries
or 48 guns. The second division has a brigade of
three divisions, eight or nine batteries, 64 or 72 guns.
The corps aggregates 32,000 infantry and 112 or 120
guns, making from 3^ to 3^ guns per thousand. A
cavalry division, 3,600 sabers, has two horse batteries,
12 guns. A rifle division of 12,000 men has four field
batteries, 32 guns.

France retains the corps artillery. Each infantry
division has two groupes of three field batteries each ;

the corps (two divisions, 32,000 men) has three groupes
of three field batteries each, and one groupe of two
horse batteries. Total for the corps, 23 batteries, 92
guns, or a little less than three guns per thousand.
In addition, heavy guns in varying numbers are
assigned to the corps. The cavalry divisions average
some 3,000 sabers; each has a groupe of two horse
batteries.

Japan has no army corps, but forms armies of from
two to four divisions. Each division consists of two
regular and one reserve infantry brigades, about
18,000 men ; it has a light or mountain artillery regi-
ment of thirty-six guns, and a reserve battery of six
guns. To army headquarters, besides the heavy
guns, is assigned an artillery brigade of varying
strength. Thus Kuroki's and Oku*s armies consisted
of four divisions each, and to each army was as-
signed an artillery brigade of three regiments. This
made the paper strength in artillery 3.8 guns per
thousand infantry ; but the reserve batteries failed
to materialize, and the artillery brigades were cut
down to two regiments each, to provide guns required
elsewhere ; so the actual strength was three guns per
thousand.

In England, each infantry division, 8,000 men, re-
ceives two brigades of field artillery. The corps, of
three divisions, has, in addition to the eighteen,
divisional batteries, one brigade of three batteries, of
light field howitzers, and one brigade of two batteries
of horse artillery. The corps of 24,000 infantry has,
then, twenty-three batteries, 138 guns, or 5^ per thou-
sand, besides whatever heavy guns may be assigned.
The cavalry brigade of 2,500 sabers has one battery
of horse artillery.

CHAPTER* III.

MATERIEL.

It is generally understood that during the last
ten years or so there has been a complete rearma-
ment of the jBeld artillery of the world. This re-
armament has not been merely a gradual process of
improvement, such as is constantly taking place ; it
has been the definite abandonment of one type and
the substitution of another, radically different, — a
change as radical as that from the muzzle loader to
the breech loader.

The new type of gun is commonly known as a
" rapid firer." This term is a convenient designa-
tion, but can not be considered as an accurately de-
scriptive title, since rapidity of fire is not by any
means the only, or even the most important, charac-
teristic of the type.

Our old 3.2-inch gun, just withdrawn from service,
is an excellent example of the old type ; our present
3-inch gun, of the new. Since much uncertainty still
exists as to exactly what is meant by a ** rapid-fire
field gun,** a comparison of the two may help to clear
the matter up.

To open the breech of the old gun, it was neces-
sary to unlock the mechanism by lifting a lever, rotate
the breech-block, pull it to the rear, and swing it to one
side. All these operations are performed in the new
gun by the continuous motion of one single lever.

In loading the old gun, the projectile had first to
be inserted and rammed home, then the powder
charge pushed in. The new ammunition is fixed, and
the gun is loaded in the same manner as a rifle.

The old gun having been loaded and the breech
closed, a primer, to which a lanyard had previously
been hooked, was inserted in the vent. With the
new ammunition, the primer is not a separate part,
but is fixed in the cartridge case, so that the gun is
ready for firing the instant the breech is closed.

In aiming the old gun, the only way to point it
for direction was to move the trail — an essentially
slow and inaccurate method ; and the sight had to be
removed from its socket before firing. The new
piece can be traversed on the carriage through a con-
siderable angle, by means of gear in the hands of the
gunner himself, who remains during the firing with
his eye at the sight, keeping the piece continuously
trained on the target. Only an approximate direction
is given by shifting the trail.

With the old gun, indirect laying, that is, train-
ing upon a target invisible to the gunner, was slow,
difficult and inaccurate ; with the new one, it is as
easy and accurate as direct aiming; in fact, in some
respects, it is even a more simple and accurate process.

The old gun, with its carriage, recoiled bodily
along the ground ; the cannoneers had to step clear
before firing, and the piece had to be run up into
position again and relaid for each shot. The new
piece recoils independently of its carriage, which re-
mains motionless, and is returned immediately to the
firing position by springs; all cannoneers remain at
their posts, and the gun remains trained on the target.

The new gun throws a projectile i^ pounds
heavier than the old, with a slightly greater muzzle
velocity ; the number of bullets in each shrapnel is
about 50 per cent, greater; and the effective range
for shrapnel has been increased about 50 per cent.

This outline will serve to show in a general way
what advantages have been gained by the rearma-
ment ; we will now examine the new materiel itself.

The breech mechanism is of the slotted screw type ;
the block has two threaded and two planed sectors,
hence requiring ninety degrees rotation to unlock.
The breech is opened by a single horizontal motion
of the operating lever ; the first part of this motion
rotates and unlocks the block, and latches it to the
block carrier, and the remainder swings block and
carrier to the right, pivoting on the hinge-pin ; this
leaves the block clear of the breech recess, with its
axis at right angles to that of the gun. A latch,
which guards against accidental moving of the lever,
is placed in the lever handle in such a manner that
the grasp of the hand on the handle releases the
latch.

Since fixed ammunition is used, no pad or other
obturating device on the breech block is necessary ;
the cartridge case itself acts as a gas check, prevent-
ing the escape of powder gas to the rear.

An extractor is provided, engaging the head of
the cartridge case and throwing it clear of the breech
when the block is withdrawn.

Percussion primers being used, a firing pin and
appropriate mechanism are enclosed in the block.
As the block is rotated in opening, the firing pin is
drawn back and held by the sear ; but the firing pin
spring is not compressed until the last motion of lock-

ing the block. As shown in Fig. i, the axes of the
gun and block do not quite coincide ; the firing pin
is placed eccentrically in the block, so that in the firing
position it lies in the axis of the piece, and conse-
quently in line with the primer of the cartridge. As
the block is rotated to open the breech the pin moves
to one side, clear of the primer, and remains in that
relative position until the block is again rotated in
closing the breech. As a further precaution, the
trigger engages the sear only when the mechanism
is in the locked position.

*■* Po&ilion of RririjJ Pin,
Block unlocWl.

Fig. 1.

The trigger handle is on the right hand side of
the piece and is fixed to a non-recoiling part of the
carriage. This handle engages the trigger mechan-
ism only when the gun is **in battery/* that is, when
counter-recoil is complete. A lanyard may be at-
tached to the trigger if it is desired to stand clear of
the carriage in firing ; as, for example, on a pave-
ment or hard ground, where it is feared that the trail
spade, which is intended to anchor the carriage, may
not take hold. A double action trigger mechan-
ism is used on the guns of most recent manufacture,

so that in case of missfires a second trial may be
made without touching the operating lever.

The gun proper is a nickel- steel, built-up, rifled
piece, consisting essentially of a tube with jacket
shrunk on. The caliber is 3 inches ; length of bore 28
calibers, or 84 inches; total length of piece, 87.8 inches;
maximum range for shrapnel, 6,500 yards. The piece
has no trunnions, but is held in what is called a
cradle, which forms a part of the carriage, and in
which the gun can move only longitudinally.

The recoil of the gun in the cradle is limited and
controlled by means of an hydraulic cylinder and
piston. The cylinder lies within the cradle, under
the gun ; it is a steel tube, about six feet long and a
trifle less than three inches in outside diameter. Its
rear end is bolted to a lug on the under side of the
gun.

The piston rod is secured at its forward end to
the cradle, and passes through a stuffing box in the
front cylinder head. The piston fits easily in the
cylinder bore, and has three notches cut in its cir-
cumference, so that liquid may pass from one end of
the cylinder to the other.

Upon firing, the cylinder recoils with the gun,
the piston remaining stationary ; the resistance
caused by the passage of the liquid in the cylinder
through the notches of the piston head controls the
recoil, which is limited to 45 inches.

To check the force of recoil gradually and easily,
three longitudinal ribs, or throttling bars, of uniform
width, but varying height, are formed on the interior
walls of the cylinder. These lie in the notches of
the piston head, and gradually close them during re-

coil ; thus the resistance to recoil is constantly in-
creased, until the piece is brought to rest.

A diagrammatic representation of these parts is
seen in Fig. 2.

The total weight of liquid in the cylinder is only
about seven pounds. A special quality of oil is used,
instead of the glycerin and water mixture, which is
common abroad.

- cylinder
--Pi»loTj >\ttad.

Transversa Section -Pistor> hem^
LoTjgitucliT)al Seclion-ThrottliDg bar.

Fig. 2.

Helical springs, assembled in the cradle around
the cylinder, absorb enough of the energy of recoil
to return the gun promptly to its firing position.
The spring column, consisting ot three springs, end
to end, is assembled under an initial compression of
something over 500 pounds, and will return the piece
to battery even at maximum elevation. The motion
is very quick; some twenty unaimed shots per minute
are possible.

The springs being thus powerful, some means
must be provided for checking the counter-recoil with

the least possible shock, so as not to injure the parts
or unnecessarily derange the aim. This is accom-
plished by fitting a slightly tapered rod, about i8
inches long, to the inside of the rear cylinder end ;
this fits, with very slight clearance, into a hole bored
axially in the piston rod. As the piece returns to bat-
tery, liquid is caught in this cup, and can escape only
through the small clearance, thus forming a cushion.
Fig. 3 shows the principle of this device.

— 'Cy^indaT

'Pis! on rod*

*--Buff*y rod ^sto-n head

Longitudinal Section.counter-recoil Buffer

Fig. 3.

The cradle rests upon a platform called the rocker,
upon which it is pivoted so as to have a motion in
azimuth of eight degrees — four degrees on each side
of the normal. This rocker is journaled on the axle,
about which it may be rotated; it thus forms an in-
termediate part, connecting the upper carriage, al-
ready described, with the lower carriage, which con-
sists of the wheels, axle, trail and elevatifig device ;
the last named part is a double screw arrangement,
the outer screw connected to the trail and the inner
screw to the breech end of the rocker. When the
carriage is standing on level ground, the maximum
elevation is 15 degrees; maximum depression, 5
degrees. The height of the axis of the piece above
the ground is 41 inches.

To relieve the traversing and elevating gear from
strain while traveling, the cradle can be locked to the
trail.

The energy of recoil, though taken up and dis-
tributed in the manner described, must of course
come ultimately to the lower carriage. To prevent
the carriage from being moved out of place, a fixed
spade is provided at the end of the trail, which, on
ordinary ground, is buried at the first shot, and
thereafter holds the carriage stationary. It is neces-
sary to watch this spade during firing on unfavorable
ground, to see that it is holding properly; a short
trench is often dug to receive it. The ordinary road
brake may be used to lock the wheels, and so relieve
the pressure on the trail spade.

For the protection of the personnel against small
arm and shrapnel bullets, a steel shield 0.2 inches thick
is provided. It consists of three plates, apron, main
and top shields, which fold together for traveling.
When extended the bottom of the apron is 5 inches,
and the top of the top shield 62 inches, above the
ground. This is sufficient height to afford protection
to cannoneers on the trail seats, even against long
range or high angle fire.

Before acceptance, each plate is tested by firing
at it at a range of 100 yards, with the service rifle
and ammunition ; the plate must not be penetrated,
cracked, broken or materially deformed. Each ac-
cepted plate bears the scar of this test in the form of
a slight indentation.

Seats are attached to the trail, for the gunner and
firing number when the piece is unlimbered. Axle
seats are also provided for cannoneers when traveling.

Under the axle seats are four steel tubes, each

intended to carry one round of ammunition, for
emergency use only.

The laying apparatus consists of two instruments: —
the sight, mounted on the left side, and the range
quadrant, on the right side, of the piece unlimbered.
In use, both instruments are fixed to non recoiling
parts of the carriage ; when traveling, they are
carried in leather-lined, sheet steel cases, supported
upon springs and fixed to the main shield.

The sight is telescopic, of peculiar form. Light
entering at the reflector opening is reflected directly
downward through a tube, and then again reflected
ninety degrees to the eyepiece. The vertical dis-
tance between eyepiece and reflector opening is such
that when a man's eye is at the former, the latter is
above the top of his head. Cross-hairs are provided
in the plane of the image, so that the effect is the
same as having the distance between front and
rear sights equal to the range; that is, when the sight
is directed upon any object, the cross appears to be
drawn upon the object itself, as in a transit.

The sight is supported upon a shank, curved to
an arc of a circle, fitting into a bracket riveted to
the cradle; by means of this shank, with suitable
gearing, proper elevation may be given the sight for
different ranges. A cross-level is also provided, to
correct for difference in the level of the wheels when
in position. A sighting port is, of course, cut in the
shield.

An or Aindiry peep sight is supported upon the same
shank ; it is used in connection with a front sight on
the forward end of the cradle. The distance between
front and rear sights is about 37 inches; this, conse-

quently, is the radius used in striking the arc of the
rear sight shank.

The height of the line of sight above the ground
is, for the peep sight, 45 inches when the gun is at zero
elevation. With the telescopic sight the reflector
opening is about 7 inches higher.

The most noticeable thing about this telescopic
sight is the arrangement for setting off deflection, —
that is, moving the plane of sight out of its normal
position parallel to the plane of fire. All previous
service sights were constructed on the plan of the
rifle sight wind gauge ; a very limited motion on each
side of the normal was provided, the scale reading
zero at normal and being graduated right and left.
With such sights, indirect laying was difficult, and
even impossible to the extent now contemplated; and
mistakes sometimes occurred, even with good gun-
ners, through allowances being set off on the wrong
side.

The new sight (called, from this pecularity, the
panorama sight) is so constructed that, while the eye-
piece remains fixed, the upper part, containing the
reflector, can be turned through a whole circle, and
an object situated even in the direct rear of the gun
may be observed through it. A very ingenious op-
tical contrivance makes the image in the eye piece
always erect, in whatever direction the reflector
opening points. The value of this arrangement will
be seen when the subject of indirect fire is discussed.

The graduation of the sight limb is not in degrees
and minutes, but in *' points'* or ''mihy This unit
is theoretically that angle, something over three
minutes, whose natural tangent is o.ooi. Thus if,
firing at a given range, the deflection set off on the

sight be changed by one mil, the point of fall of the
projectile at the next shot will, theoretically, be
moved laterally ^wifTf of the range.

The number of mils in a complete circle is nearly,
but not quite, 6,400, and the graduation of the sight
limb is arranged accordingly. The exact number
would evidently be 6,283 and a fraction (2 X 3. 14 16 X
1,000) ; but the error caused by using this convenient
even number is so slight as to be negligible, amount-
ing to only 1.8 per cent.

Using this sight and direct aiming, the proper
elevation and direction may be given the gun, and
the proper deflection allowances to compensate for
wind, drift, etc., made, by the gunner alone, who is
seated on the left trail seat with the elevating and
traversing gear at hand.

If desired, however, aiming for direction alone
may be left to the gunner, and the elevation given
by cannoneer No. i, who sits on the right trail seat
with the range quadrant in front of him, and who
has control of a second elevating crank.

T/ie quadrant is a special form of clinometer, and
measures vertical angles from the horizontal. The
sight measures its vertical angles, not from the hori-
zontal, but from the line joining piece and target.
All range tables necessarily give sight elevations.
In order to use the quadrant, therefore, it is necessary
to correct the sight elevation by adding to it or sub-
tracting from it another angle, called the *' angle of
site,** — that is, the angle between the horizontal and
the line joining piece and target. The result is what
is called the "quadrant elevation" for the range in
question, and evidently varies, not only with the

range, but also with the difference in level of gun
and target.

Fig. 4 shows the different angles mentioned.

The quadrant is so constructed as to give auto-
matically this algebraic sum, or ** quadrant elevation.*'

The angle of site is first measured with the bat-
tery commander's telescope or in any other conven-
ient manner, and the clinometer scale of the quadrant

le of d«partttr«>

Horizontal

Target
.in* of dopartuTik

Gun^

Hortzont«1

'^Quadrant e1«vatior)

Rg. 4

is set accordingly. This scale is graduated in mils»
and employs the same principle of continuous gradu-
ation as the sight limb; the reading when level is
not zero, but 300, and the graduation is from 200 to
400. Hence any desired elevation or depression is
absolutely designated by its number alone, the num-
ber being less than 300 for a target below the gun,
and greater for one above ; and even the most inex-
perienced cannoneer could not make the mistake of

setting off an elevation when a depression was
ordered, or vice versa

The clinometer scale being set for angle of site,
the range dial is set for the range. The result of
these two operations is that the instrument mechani-
cally combines the two angles, — angle of site and
sight elevation, — and that a level borne by the quad-
rant is set at an angle to the axis of the piece equal
to their algebraic sum.

The gun is now elevated or depressed until the
level bubble is centered ; it is then correctly laid in
elevation.

Much consideration has been given to the proper
size of the wheels. Large wheels give easier draft,
and also greater free space underneath ; on the other
hand, they increase weight, and necessitate a longer
trail to give stability when firing, — for the shock of
discharge tends to raise the wheels from the ground,
rotating the whole carriage about the end of the trail.
The wheel finally adopted has a diameter of 56 inches,
a trifle smaller than the wheel of the 3.2 inch gun.
There is an oil reservoir in the axle, which can be
filled without removing the wheel. The breadth of
tire is 3 inches; the track, 60 inches.

The limber is all steel, except pole and wheels.
Gun and caisson limbers are identical. Space is pro-
vided in the chest for 39 rounds of ammunition,
packed horizontally, bases to the rear, — three rows
of thirteen each, the cases fitting into holes in vertical
partitions. Three of these holes, however, are not
ordinarily to be used for ammunition, but are to con-
tain oil cans, one for kerosene, one for lubricating
and one for cylinder oil. Thus there are forty rounds

with the gun, counting the four under the axle
seats.

The rear wall of the chest is hinged to form a
door, which opens downward, being held in a hori-
zontal position by chains. This door is corrugated,
both to give increased stiffness and to avoid direct
contact between it and the primers in the cartridge
cases. No springs or cushions are provided to pro-
tect the ammunition from jar, as such protection has
been found to be unnecessary.

Attachments are provided on the limber for the
usual tools — ax, pick, shovel and hatchet, — and also
for lanterns, picket lines and watering buckets.

The system of draft is the same as that employed
with the old materiel, that is, continuous traces
throughout the team, attached to pivoted single and
doubletrees. The harness is the same as before.

The gun and carriage complete, with shield and
four rounds of ammunition, weigh 2,480 pounds; the
limber, with all equipment and full chest, weighs
1,612 pounds; thus the total weight behind the gun
team is 4,092 pounds, 65 pounds more than with the
3.2. inch gun. It is this consideration of weight which
is the controlling factor in determining the caliber to
be adopted, for experience has shown that sufficient
mobility for a gun intended to accompany rapidly
moving columns in the field can not be retained if the
weight behind the team is very much over 650 pounds
per horse. Six horses is the usual limit for teams
intended for quick work; increase beyond this num-
ber does not increase the power in the same propor-
tion ; hence the weight for a light field gun should
not greatly exceed 3,900 pounds. This materiel, it

will be noted, approximates fairly well to this re-
quirement.

The weight of the caisson is somewhat greater,
being 4,258 pounds when fully loaded and equipped.
An excess, however, is allowable in a caisson which
might be objectionable in a gun carriage, as the re-
moval of a very few rounds of ammunition reduces
the weight materially. The old caisson was given a
still greater excess of weight, weighing, fully packed,
4,553 pounds.

The caisson body carries only one chest, but it is
much larger than that of the limber, containing 70
rounds of ammunition, packed in five rows of four-
teen each. The front of the chest is of armor plate,
the same as is used in the gun shield. An apron
shield of the same plate is hinged under the axle, so
as to be lowered in action and raised when traveling.
When lowered it reaches to within 5.5 inches of the
ground.

The rear wall of the chest forms the door; it
opens upward, swinging 120 degrees, in which posi-
tion it catches and holds. It is of armor plate like
the shield, but slightly thinner, and is intended to
deflect upward any bullets that may clear the chest.
Instead of corrugations to form the primer guard,
steel T's are riveted to the inner face of the door;
when this is closed, the upright legs of the T's fall
between rows of cartridges, and the horizontal legs
extend a short distance across the cartridge heads ;
the cartridges are thus held firmly in place, without
contact between door and primer. The T's also give
additional stiffness.

Caisson bodies, like limbers, are provided with
pintles in rear, so that several bodies may be coupled

together as trailers behind one team. This may at
times result in marked economy in animals, when
moving ammunition over good roads or taking empty
caissons to the rear.

A trail prop, somewhat similar to the pole prop of
a limber, forms a third point of support for the cais-
son body when unlimbered.

From the preceding descriptions it will be seen
that the ammunition with the battery is, for each gun
carriage, 40 rounds, — 36 in the limber chest and 4
under the axle seats ; for each caisson, 106, — 36 in the
limber and 70 in the caisson body.

As each four-gun battery on a war footing will
have twelve caissons, the ammunition with the bat-
tery will be 1,432 rounds, or 358 rounds per gun.

The battery wagon and forge is constructed like a
caisson, except that the chests are arranged to carry
blacksmith's, carpenter's and saddler's tool kits and
materials. The store wagon is similar to the battery
wagon and forge, but the chests are fitted to carry
repair material and spare parts for the battery.
Both battery wagon and store wagon carry spare
wheels, two each.

The ammunition to be carried includes shrapnel
and high explosive shell. The issue of cast iron
common shell will be discontinued when the present
supply is exhausted. The projectiles all have the
same weight, 15 pounds, but not the same length;
the ammunition chests are so constructed as to hold
either length securely. The proportion of shell to
be carried has not been definitely fixed; present
allowances are ^ shrapnel and -^^ shell.

Shrapnel is of course the most important projectile.
Several models have been and still are in service, but

all but one will disappear as soon as the present
supply is exhausted.

In the model adopted, the case is of drawn steel
with solid base. The mouth of the case is closed by
an aluminum head, screwed in and tapped to take
the service combination time and percussion fuze.
The bursting charge is 2^ ounces of loose black
powder ; it is placed in the base, and covered by a
steel diaphragm. The diaphragm supports a steel
central tube, which extends forward through the
aluminum head to the fuze, and thus affords a conduit
for the flames to the bursting charge. At the lower
end of the central tube a stopper of dry gun-cotton is
fitted, to prevent the loose powder charge from
getting into the tube, and also to help the ignition of
the bursting charge.

The shrapnel filling is composed of 262 balls, each
0.49 inches in diameter and approximately 167 grains
in Weight. The balls are assembled around the cen-
tral tube and rest upon the steel diaphragm, the inter-
stices containing a smoke-producing matrix. This
matrix serves not only to hold all the parts securely
in place, but, on explosion, makes a clearly visible
burst and so facilitates observation of fire.

The weakest cross-section is at the line of attach-
ment of the head. Hence, on explosion of the burst-
ing charge, the head is blown off, the case usually re-
maining intact ; the case then acts like a short shot-
gun, throwing its contents to the front with an added
velocity of about 250 f. s.

With the service muzzle velocity of 1,700 f. s.,
the remaining velocity of the shrapnel at 6,500 yards
range is 700 f. s., about the same as the muzzle ve-
locity of the service revolver. If, then, the shrap-

nel be burst in the air at this range, each bullet will
have a resultant velocity of about 950 f. s., enough
to make a bullet of this weight effective at 200 or 300
yards.

These results are entirely satisfactory for a pro-
jectile to be used against animate targets in the open.
But for use against inanimate targets or entrenched
troops, something else is needed. The shrapnel bul-
let has not sufficient power to destroy materiel; and
on account of the flatness of the trajectory and the
small angle of the cone of dispersion, it can not reach
troops in any but the lightest entrenchments.

Hence, a steel shell is issued, holding about two
pounds of the service high explosive. This is burst
by a detonating percussion fuze. Those heretofore
issued carried this fuze in the point ; a new design
uses a base fuze, and is provided with a base cover to
prevent any possible leakage of powder gas into the
interior, through the fuze screw threads.

Since this shell, on detonation of the filler, gives
from 500 to 600 effective fragments, it has been pro-
posed to use it in place of shrapnel against troops in
entrenchments ; if burst at the proper point, by means
of a time fuze, the fragments would fly in all direc-
tions, and search cover in a manner impossible to
shrapnel. No satisfactory results of this nature have
been obtained, however, and no such projectile is
issued in our service.

The explosive used is a secret compound, and
combines extreme safety in transportation with ex-
treme certainty and force of action.

Experiments are being made both here and abroad,
with a view to developing a projectile which shall
unite the characteristics of shell and shrapnel, and so

simplify ammunition suppl5^ As yet no such com-
bination projectile has been produced which is sat-
isfactory either as shell or shrapnel, but it is hoped
that one may soon be produced.

The combination time and percussion fuze issued is a
great improvement over the old one, in that it is set
for time, not by punching, but by turning a disc
about an axis coinciding with that of the projectile.
One-half the time train is contained in the disc, the
other half in the fuze body ; the angle through which
the disc is turned determines the amount of train
which must burn before the flame reaches the burst-
ing charge. After an old model fuze was once set, it
could hot be used at a longer range, while the new
model can be set and reset repeatedly. Thus a bat-
tery may, if desired, go into action with all its fuzes
set at zero, ready to use its maximum canister effect
at a moment's notice, and still reset fuzes as desired
for any range.

The ease and certainty of fuze setting is also
greatly increased. A device for setting is attached
to each caisson ; it has two scales — a range scale and
a "corrector** for adjusting height of burst. The
corrector scale is graduated in mils, the reading 30
corresponding, with normal fuzes, to the normal
height of burst, y^V^r ^^ ^^® range. The two scales
being set as directed, the cannoneer has only to insert
the point of the projectile, containing the fuze, into
the instrument and turn it as far as it will go. The
fuze is then set so as to burn the requisite number
of seconds before exploding.

If the corrector were set at zero, this number of
seconds would be equal to the full time of flight for
the range set on the range scale, and, theoretically,

the time and percussion elements of the fuze would
act at the same instant. Setting the corrector at any
number above zero changes the relative position of
the parts in such a way that the time setting of the
fuze will be less than the time of flight ; that is. the
higher the corrector setting the shorter the burning
time of the fuze, and consequently the higher the
burst.

The propelling charge is about 24 ounces of
smokeless powder, nitro-cellulose ; the exact amount
varies with the lots of powder, being adjusted so as
to give the standard muzzle velocity of 1,700 f. s.
To ignite this charge completely and uniformly, two
black powder igniters are used, each of no grains
weight. One is placed in the primer, the other at
the front of the charge.

A round of ammunition complete, with its brass
case, weighs 18.8 pounds.

A very important accessory of the battery is the
battery commander s telescope. This is an instrument
somewhat similar to the panorama sight, but larger
and more powerful, and mounted on a tripod. It is
capable of measuring both horizontal and vertical
angles, and its graduation corresponds to that of the
sight. By its aid the battery commander determines
deflection allowances and measures angles of site; it
may also be used to observe the fire, or, if a little time
is available, as a range finder. For quicker and
rougher measurement of angles a short rule is issued,
graduated in mils, and provided with a cord, by
means of which it can be held at a fixed distance
from the eye.

In Chapter II it was shown that the artillery of
an army must consist of various weapons, differing

from each other both in caliber and kind of fire. The
piece just described is the first to be issued of a
complete series, all of which are to be of the same
general type.

In this series, the 3 inch gun is classified as a light
field gun. Three of our six field artillery regiments,
designated as ** light," are armed with it, as is also
the one regiment designated as *' horse." As a com-
panion piece to it, having about the same weight but
using curved fire, a 3.8-inch howitzer has been de-
signed, which will carry a thirty- pound projectile.

Since, as has just been mentioned, our horse bat-
teries are all armed with the 3 -inch gun, they differ
from light batteries only in that the cannoneers are all
mounted, instead of riding on the carriages or march-
ing on foot. Horse artillery is primarily intended to
operate with cavalry, and requires great mobility ;
and it is believed by many that, to secure this, the
gun should be lighter. The generally accepted view
is that the weight behind horse artillery teams should
be reduced to as near 3,000 pounds as possible.

The Ordnance Department has been studying the
question of a smaller caliber gun, but no design has
yet been evolved that seems satisfactory. One propo-
sition was to make a five- pounder, of about 2 inches
caliber. This would have been a very light gun, but
would have been able to use only shell. Shrapnel
depends for its effect upon the number of separate
missiles into which it separates on explosion. The
lighter the shrapnel, the larger the proportion of
weight that must be devoted to the case, and the
smaller the number of bullets ; in a shrapnel so small
as five pounds, the number of bullets would be so
small that the projectile would be ineffective. It is

not considered admissible to give up the shrapnel in
any field gun, and hence so extreme a reduction in
caliber is not acceptable to the horse artillery.

The two remaining regiments of our field artillery
are armed with mountain guns. These, of course,
are less powerful than the regular field guns, and are
not capable of such rapid motion on roads or over
easy country; but they can be taken into positions
and maneuver without difficulty in country that
would be impossible for the field guns.

The mountain gun now in use is of foreign manu-
facture ; it is of modern construction, has a caliber of
75 mm. (2. 95 inches), and is arranged for either pack
or wheel transportation. The former is always used
in our service.

The gun has a recoil on the carriage of 14 inches ;
the recoil and counter-recoil mechanism are on the
same principle as described above, although different
in detail. The wheels are 36 inches in diameter ; the
track is 32 inches. In firing, the wheels may be
attached to the trail by ropes to prevent their revolv-
ing; this arrangement, together with a trail spade,
reduces, but does not entirely prevent, recoil on the
ground. The shrapnel weighs 12^ pounds; the
muzzle velocity is 920 f. s.; maximum range, about
4,000 yards. Four pack mules are required for each
piece, one carrying the gun, one the cradle with attach-
ments, one the trail with attachments, and one the
wheels and axle. Additional mules carry ammuni-
tion, twelve rounds each. The loads average 320
pounds, including harness. This is a very useful and,
in general, satisfactory gun ; it is proposed to retain
the type, but increase the caliber to a full 3 inches,
give the piece a longer recoil on the carriage, in

order to secure more stability in firing, and provide
laying apparatus similar to that of the field gun.

We have at present no heavy field batteries, but
the necessity for providing them is evident. Their
importance in a pitched battle has recently been em-
phasized by events in Manchuria and South Africa.
Recognizing this necessity, the Ordnance Department
has designed several heavy guns, some of which have
been completed and have undergone some tests.

Much of the mobility insisted upon in a light field
gun may here be sacrificed to gain power, since these
guns would not be expected to accompany quickly
moving columns, and need be capable of rapid move-
ment only for short distances, and that rarely. The
only question is, just how much mobility to dispense
with.

The basis adopted by the Ordnance Department
for designing heavy field materiel was a weight of
4,800 pounds. This would give a gun capable of
being handled by a six-horse team, at such speeds as
would be required.

Without greatly exceeding this weight, a 3.8-inch
gun can be constructed, carrying a thirty-pound pro-
jectile, and this it has been decided to do. This piece
corresponds to the old 3.6-inch twenty pounder gun,
but is heavier and more powerful. The correspond-
ing howitzer will be of 4.7-inch caliber, and carry a
sixty-pound projectile.

There is a strong feeling that these two guns will
prove unsuitable for their purpose. They seem to
be a compromise — not mobile enough for one class^
and not powerful enough for the other. They are
inferior in power to corresponding weapons abroad.

Hence it may be that this class may be aban-

doned, and replaced by what is now officially known
as siege materiel. The basis of design for this class
was a team of eight heavy horses, and a load of i ,000
pounds per horse ; this gives mobility sufficient for
heavy field purposes, and more than sufficient for
siege work. The gun is a 4.7-inch sixty-pounder, and
the howitzer a 6 inch 120-pounder; the pilot guns
are now undergoing test. The corresponding old
pieces were the 5 -inch 45 -pounder gun and the 7-inch
105 -pounder howitzer.

If these guns are turned over to heavy field
batteries, more powerful ones should be prepared for
siege work. Their weight need not be much re-
stricted by considerations of mobility; when siege
guns are needed there is plenty of time to bring
them into position, and when once placed they rarely
have to move. In long sieges even heavy seacoast
guns can be used, as was done at Port Arthur.

For purposes of comparison, some of the details of
foreign guns may be of interest. Mountain guns
and all of the heavier types will here be disregarded,
and only the standard type of each country men-
tioned.

As is well known, the French were the pioneers in
developing rapid fire field artillery materiel and
methods. All other countries have now followed
their lead and adopted some form of rapid fire gun.

Some chose an intermediate type, having **accel-
erated fire,** — so called for lack of a better name, —
which was often constructed by modifications in old
materiel Of this class was the gun used by Japan in
the late war.

It is known as the Arisaka gun, and was adopted
in 190 1, superseding a bronze Krupp 9-pounder. It

is of steel, built up, has a caliber of 75 mm. (2.95
inches), and fires an eleven-pound projectile ; the max-
imum range for shrapnel is 5,000 yards. The ammu-
nition is ** semi-fixed" ; that is, the powder charge and
primer are put up in a brass case, but the projectile
is separate. The breech mechanism is of the slotted
screw type ; the block, which contains the percussion
firing mechanism, opens downward.

The gun is rigidly mounted on its carriage by
means of trunnions. The whole carriage, therefore,
runs to the rear on firing, but a device consisting of
a recoil brake and wheel shoes is used to check recoil
and return the piece to battery. This device is con-
structed as follows.

On the inner side of the hub of each wheel is an
annular groove, in which a rope runs. One end of
each rope is fastened to the wheel shoe, the rope
then passed around the hub, and the other end at-
tached to a cross-head at the end of a piston rod lying
between the flasks of the trail. The flasks are
grooved to make a slide for the cross-head. The
wheel shoes are hung from the axle by chains, and
have spade-like projections on the under side, which
the wheels, on recoil, force into the ground.

When the piece is fired, the wheels run back onto
the shoes, forcing them down. A pull is thus
brought upon the ropes, which is transmitted to the
cross-head and piston rod, compressing powerful
springs. The pull ceasing, the springs expand again,
returning the gun to battery. The average length
of recoil is fifty centimeters.

Since the gun seldom returns into precisely its
original position, it must be relaid for each shot.
The rate of fire is given as seven shots per minute.

The carriage has no shield. The sights are not
telescopic, but an arrangement is provided by which
indirect laying is practicable, using an aiming point
situated in any direction from the gun.

This may be taken as a fair example of ** acceler-
ated fire'* guns; it is, however, a type that has now
almost disappeared, and is mentioned here only on
account of its performances in the late war.

The Russian guns opposed to this were of several
types. The one that appears to have predominated
was a 3 inch 13^ -pounder; it had recoil on the car-
riage, checked by hydraulic buffers and by rubber pads,
which latter also served to return it to battery. The
carriage jumped more or less on firing, the sights
recoiled with the gun, and there was no shield.
Although superior to the Japanese armament, this
was not satisfactory; a new gun, known as Model 1902,
was adopted, and later further improved as Model
1903, but it is doubtful if many of these had been put
in service before the end of the war.

The 1903 gun is of nickel steel; the caliber is 3
inches and length 30 calibers ; the projectile weighs
a trifle under fifteen pounds. The breech mechan-
ism is of the single motion slotted screw type.

The piece recoils 40 inches on the carriage, its
motion being controlled by an hydraulic brake; return
to battery is by springs. The carriage is mounted on
5 3 -inch wheels and provided with a shield.

The traversing device differs radically from our
own ; instead of the gun being pivoted on the lower
carriage, the entire carriage may be slid along the
axle, pivoting on the end of the trail. By this ar-
rangement, the force of recoil is always in line with
the trail, not, as with us, often at an angle with it;

but a great deal of lateral motion is necessary in
order to give a small change in direction, since the
radius of rotation is so long.

Panoramic sights were not adopted for the 1902
gun, but have been introduced in this newer model.

Fixed ammunition is used; both shrapnel and
high explosive shell are carried. Gun limbers hold
36 rounds, caissons 96. The muzzle velocity is higher
than that of any other field gun — 1,930 f. s. This
high velocity has its advantages, but also its disad-
vantages.

The weight behind the team, limber filled, is
given as about 4,200 pounds.

Germany clung to the **accelerated fire*' gun longer
than any other first class power ; and even now, when
re-armament with new guns is in progress, German
ideas do not seem to incline to very radical changes
in the handling of them.

The gun now being withdrawn from service.
Model 1896, was a steel 15-pounder, caliber yy mm.,
or a little over 3 inches, length 27.3 calibers ; the am-
munition was only semi-fixed. The gun and am-
munition are retained, but the breech mechanism and
carriage are new.

The gun trunnions have been removed, clips
added, to slide on the cradle guides, and an attach-
ment at the breech end provided to connect the gun
and the recoil buffer.

The breech mechanism is of the Ehrhardt single
motion pattern ; instead of a screw block, a wedge is
used, sliding laterally in a recess cut through the
breech end of the gun. The firing handle is on the
piece itself, not on a non-recoiling part of the carriage,
and so is pulled out of the firer's hand by the recoil.

The recoil arrangements are on the same princi-
ple as our own ; the length of recoil is 44 inches.
Elevating and traversing gears also are similar to
ours, but there appears to be no lock for them when
traveling.

Model '96 wheels, 53.3 inches in diameter, are re-
tained. The height of the axis of the piece is
40 inches. The shield is in three parts, somewhat
like ours.

In the matter of laying apparatus, the Germans
have been very conservative. Panorama sights are
looked upon as complicated contrivances, not reliable
for service. Even ordinary telescopic sights seem
to be regarded with suspicion. A set of instruments
has been devised, and apparently officially adopted,
which includes a telescopic sight on the left of the
gun, and a separate appliance, not telescopic, on the
right, for giving direction in indirect laying. But
even this equipment has not won the unanimous ap-
proval of artillery officers, many of whom, at least,
still adhere to open sights. Direct fire is faivored;
and indirect fire, when used, is often managed by
some of the older methods.

The muzzle velocity is low — 1,525 f. s. As al-
ready stated, the ammunition is only semi-fixed ; it
includes shrapnel and high explosive shell, both pro-
vided with combination time and percussion fuzes.
Each gun limber carries 36 rounds, each caisson 88.
The weight of the gun, with limber filled, is about
4,175 pounds.

The French gun, about which so much has been
written, is somewhat different from any of those
above described. The essential distinction is in the

recoil device, and, specifically, in the means adopted
for returning the piece to battery after firing.

This part of the carriage consists of three cylin-
ders ; two contain liquid, the third, air under a com-
pression of 12 atmospheres. When the gun is fired,
the hydraulic cylinders act as already described to
check the recoil at about 42 inches, but the return is
accomplished by the pneumatic cylinder, the air con-
tained therein being still further compressed by the
motion of recoil.

The weakness of this system is evidently the
multiplication of stuffing boxes and valves, with con-
sequent danger of leakage of oil or air. If the air
pressure, from either of these causes, becomes re-
duced, the gun does not return completely to battery.
If it comes within 8 cm. of its true position, firing
is safe; if it does not, it is necessary to bring up the
pressure again. Marks are placed on the gun and
buffer, to show whether or not return is complete.

The gun is not perfectly stable in firing. To
make it so it is necessary to anchor it by means of
wheel shoes.

The French claim that no serious difficulty is ex-
perienced with this mechanism, and even insist that
it is superior to the spring column ; but it should be
said that in 1897, when this gun was adopted, the
spring system was far from its present efficiency, it
having been a matter of much time and labor to pro-
duce suitable springs. Incidentally, the report may
be mentioned that the hydro pneumatic feature is
to be abandoned in a new gun projected for the French
horse artillery. This gun, it is said, will be uniform
in caliber with the present field gun, but lighter in
weight.

The present gun is of nickel steel, caliber 75 mm.,
or 2.95 inches, length 35 calibers, weight of projectile
nearly 16 pounds. The breech mechanism is the
Deport eccentric screw. The breech block is cylin-
drical, some 6 inches in diameter ; on one side of the
axis it is cut out so as to leave a hole the size of the
bore of the gun. This block is placed with its axis
parallel to that of the gun, but lower, and so secured
that it is capable of rotation only. When it is turned
so that the cut-out side is up, the breech is open, for
loading or ejection of an empty cartridge case ; when
it is turned 180 degrees, the breech is closed and the
firing pin is opposite the primer.

The elevating system consists of two independent
parts. One moves the gun and its recoil control-
ling attachments with reference to the upper part of
the carriage, and is controlled by a crank on the right
side of the piece ; the other moves the whole upper
carriage, to which is attached the sighting appa-
ratus, and is operated by a hand wheel on the left
side. The elevation corresponding to the range is
given by the firing number, on the right. When in-
direct laying is resorted to, a level on the left side is
set by the laying number to the angle of site, and the
bubble centered by means of the hand wheel.

To lay in direction, an instrument called the
*' collimator" is used. This has not the advantage of
including a telescope, but it does away with the front
sight, using instead an optical line of sight contained
in the instrument itself. The collimator is mounted
on the left side of the carriage, 46 inches from the
ground, and a lengthening piece is provided for the
standard by which it may be raised higher if desired ;

it is capable of being turned about a vertical axis,
and has a limb graduated in mils.

The piece traverses on the axle, like the Russian
gun ; the limits of traverse are about 50 mils on each
side of the normal. The traversing hand wheel is
on the left side.

There are two separate shields, one on each side
of the gun, the space at the top between them being
unprotected. The ammunition is fixed, and includes
shrapnel and high explosive shell. The weight be-
hind the team is about 4,100 pounds. The muzzle
velocity is 1,650 f. s.

Since the Boer War, the English have insisted upon
high power for their field guns. They experimented
with 12- and 15-pounders from Armstrong, Maxim
and Ehrhardt, but have now adopted a 3. 3 -inch 18^-
pounder for field, and a 3-inch 12^ pounder for horse
batteries. The ammunition is fixed, and the muzzle
velocity is 1,610 f. s. for the 3.3-inch, 1,658 f. s. for the
3-inch gun. Gun limbers hold 24 rounds, caisson
limbers and bodies 38 each. The weights behind the
teams are 4,350 and 3,400 pounds respectively. Both
guns are of true rapid fire construction, but there are
no peculiarities calling for mention here.

Most other armies now have guns approximating
more or less clOwSely to some of the types described.
There now seems to be a tendency to go farther, and
adopt some kind of semi-automatic breech mechanism.

In this type, already familiar in naval and seacoast
guns, the recoil actuates mechanism which opens the
breech and ejects the empty cartridge case. A field
gun on this principle is already in use in Mexico.

The semi-automatic will probably come in time ;
the true automatic probably not. This appears to

have about reached its limit in the **potn-pom ; '*
even if an automatic gun of sufficient caliber could be
built, the difficulty of ammunition supply would neu-
tralize its advantages.

The *'pom.pom'* can hardly be considered as
artillery, but since it has sometimes been spoken of
and used as such, it may be well to discuss it here.

It is simply an ordinary machine-gun, made large
enough to throw an explosive shell; since 1868, four-
teen ounces is, by international agreement, the mini-
mum permissible weight for such a projectile The
best known model is the Maxim, of 37 mm. (i 46
inches) caliber, throwing a i -pound shell with 1,800
f . s. muzzle velocity ; shrapnel is, of course, impossi-
ble with this small caliber.

Its first use in the field was by the Boers in the
recent South African War. They had, as nearly as
can be determined, nine pieces of this type, which
were mounted on wheeled carriages, provided with
shields, and treated in all respects as artillery.

As to their actual efficiency there was a great dif-
ference of opinion ; some rated it very high, others
very low. Their moral effect was great, but it has
been aptly said that **this can not be taken as an
enduring asset, for men will soon discover that the
bark is far worse than the bite, and act accordingly."
Their actual effect on troops, especially mounted
troops in the open, was considerable, but probably the
same results could be obtained in most cases with
rifle caliber machine-guns.

On several occasions the ** pom-poms'* engaged
field guns with fair success. But it is hardly likely
that such a fight would be possible to-day ; the Eng-
lish guns at that time, it will be remembered, were

of old type and low power. With its carriage and
shield the ** pom-pom** offers a target as large as a
field gnn; it has inferior range and power, and must
expose itself more in firing.

Having introduced these guns at the time of the
Boer War, the English have retained them, but they
do not seem at all sure how to use them. At
present they assign one to each cavalry regiment and
mounted infantry battalion, forming in each such
unit a machine gun platoon armed with this gun and
one rifle caliber machine-gun. But they say little
about the effect they expect from the '* pom-pom;*'
the explanations most commonly seen for its reten-
tion are, that it makes a good range finder for the
rifle caliber machine-guns, because the bursts are so
clearly visible; and that it is a first-rate thing for
frightening horses.

No other army has yet incorporated the ** pom-
pom ** into its permanent organization. It may yet
make its place as a recognized arm, as its elder
brother, the rifle caliber machine-gun, has done; but
so far its utility appears limited. It is too weak to
^iigage field guns, and has more power than is neces-
sary to engage rifles.

CHAPTER IV.

METHODS OF FIRE; CONDUCT OF FIRE; FIRE
DIRECTION.

Since the materiel with which the artilleryman
has to deal has been so greatly altered, it has been
necessary to make corresponding changes in the
methods of handling it, both technical and tactical.
The present chapter will deal with technical meth-
ods — that is, methods of delivering and controlling
fire — and will avoid, in so far as possible, questions
of tactics — that is, of the use of that fire in action.

The organization of the battery into platoons and
sections has already been explained. Like any other
fighting unit, the battery has, in addition to this
permanent organization, certain special fighting or-
ganizations and formations. Without goijag into de-
tails, it may be said here that, in action, the first
line, or firing battery, consists of the four gun sec-
tions, and one caisson section, the fifth.

On coming into action, the caisson of each gun
section is placed abreast its piece, one foot to its left.
(See Fig. 5, and frontispiece.)

The gun is served by a squad of six men — the
gunner, who is a corporal, and five privates. The
gunner sits on the left trail seat; he has immediate
command of the squad, and lays the piece, either for
direction only, or for both direction and range.

No. I sits on the right trail seat. He opens and
closes the breech, lays for range when so ordered,
and fires the piece.

CaissoT) in Ht irnffrnrGun

•Chl«f of Sectiory

Fig. 5.

No. 2 is posted in rear of the gunner ; he moves
the trail as directed, so as to give the approximate
direction, and loads the piece.

The remaining cannoneers are posted behind the
caisson body; No. 4 operates the fuze-setter and
serves ammunition, the others assisting as he directs.

One caisson of the fifth section is on each flank of
the battery, on or near the line of guns. All Cctv-

in 5/

f^'l' t^i\i dbi|i

"^ (11 «^

In tfl

I i

illl

o;^-

(.'?

i5s

2-0

Fig. 6

riages, caissons as well as pieces, are unlimbered, and
all limbers placed under cover, preferably on a flank.
The normal interval between sections is 17 yards,
measured between adjacent gun- wheels, or about 19
yards from muzzle to muzzle. For convenience, this
interval is taken as 20 yards in all numerical calcula-
tions. (See Fig. 6.)

The battery, placed as described, is ready for
either direct or indirect fire. There has been some
hair splitting as to the exact definitions of these
terms ; but for present purposes we may take it that
direct fire, or better, direct laying, is that method
commonly employed when the target is clearly visi-
ble through the sights ; indirect fire, or indirect lay-
ing, that adopted when it is not so visible.

The commands for firing always contain the in-
formation necessary to enable the cannoneers to set
their instruments correctly. This information is
called firing data.

For direct fire, each gunner sets his sight at the
prescribed elevation and deflection, and aims his gun
as he would a rifle. The only other instrument
whose use is involved is the fuze setter in case of
time shrapnel fire. The firing data for direct fire,
then, are :

1. Deflection.

2. Corrector setting.

3. Range.

Indirect fire involves more details, which appear
at first sight somewhat troublesome.

Such fire may be delivered from any position,
provided a place can be found for the battery com-
mander's station from which both guns and target
are visible ; or even, sometimes, when no such place
is available, if an auxiliary observer can be stationed
so as to note the fall of the shots and telephone or
signal the results to the battery. It is only neces-
sary to take care that, if any high obstacle intervene
between battery and target, the position be far
enough removed from it to jcause the trajectory to

clear it. The following table shows how the ques-
tion is affected by this limitation :

EXTRACT FROM RANGE TABLE, 3" FIELD GUN, WITH SERVICE
SHRAPNEL: M. V. 1,700 F. S.

Range.
(Yards)

Angle of
Departure.

Angle of Fall.

Maximum

Ordinate.

(Feet)

500

0° 31.9^
1° 11.2^
1° 59.4"
2° 56.7^
4° 01.8^

6° 28.7^
7° 54.2^
9° 28.5^
11° lO.I^
13° 01. 1^
15° 01.8^
17° 12.6^

0° 35.3^
. 1° 27.3^
2° 38.6^
4° 07.6^
5° 48.8^
7° 41.2^
9° 43.7^
12° 02.9^

14° 37.3'
17° 26.C/
20° 29.0^
23° 40.g^
27° 06.8^

4.3

1000

1500

17.3
45-3

2000

93-1

2500

3000

163.5
257.0

3500

378.0

4000

536.0

4500

5000

731.0

975.0

1263.0

5500

6000

1598.0

6500

1992.0

The battery commander's station is preferably on
a flank of the line of guns, approximately in pro-
longation of it, or directly in rear of and above it.
It should be near enough to allow the battery com-
mander to keep in touch with both guns and station ;
if necessary, a buzzer line is laid.

The position of the station having been selected,
the chief of the third platoon and the chief of the
fifth section take post there, and set up and adjust
the telescope ; it will be remembered that the com-
mands of these two chiefs are broken up on going
into action. The battery commander meanwhile
notes the distance from the station to his right gun,
which is the directing gun of the battery, and makes
his first estimate of the range ; or, if time will per
mit, the range can be measured with considerable ac
curacy by means of the battery telescope.

Since the gunners can not see the target, an aux-
iliary point is next selected, upon which they may aim
after setting off the proper deflection on the sights.
The object chosen should be distinct and unmistak-
able ; something tall and slender, such as a flag staff
or church steeple, is best. It should preferably be a
mile or more distant, the farther the better; this
reduces its angular breadth, so minimizing the error
which may arise from aiming at different parts of it,
gives more convenient numbers for use in the calcu-
lation of deflection, and reduces the effect of inaccuracy
in estimating the range to the point, — for this range,
as well as that to the target, is noted and used in the
calculation.

The problem is, to determine the deflection that must
be set off on the sight, so that when the sight is brought to
bear upon the aiming point, the gun shall be trained upon
the target. A verbal description of the process of
solution may sound a trifle complicated, but in actual
practice, after a little experience, the complication is
not felt.

The determination of this angle requires that
three other angles be known. These are, (i) the
angle at the battery commander's station between the
aiming point and the target (marked B in Fig. 7);
(2) the angle at the target between the directing gun
and the battery commander's station (T); and (3) the
angle at the aiming point between the directing gun
and the battery commander's station (P). The bat-
tery commander's station has here been assumed on
the right flank of the line of guns ; but the same
principles apply for other locations.

Of these three angles, the first may be directly
measured with the battery commander's telescope or

rule, in the same manner as with a transit ; it will be
remembered that the readings of these instruments-
are not in degrees and minutes, but in mils.

The other two angles can not be directly measured,,
but must be computed. The data for the computa-
tion are, the ranges to the target and aiming pointy
and the distance between the. directing gun and the
battery commander's station.

^-Qun

Targ^i-

:».c:statioTi

AimiTig point.

Fig. 7.

It has already been explained that one mil is the
equivalent of a lateral displacement equal to Yinr^ ^^
the range. Therefore, the range being known, the
value of a mil in linear measure is obtained by simply
pointing ofif three places. Dividing this value into
the distance between the directing gun and the bat-
tery commander's station will give the value in mils
of the second angle required ; and a repetition of the
same process, using the range to the aiming point,
will give the third.

Referring again to Fig. 7, it will be noted that

the required deflection is the angle marked G. In
, the two triangles B P X and G T X, the angles at X
are evidently equal. Hence —

B + P = G + T, or
G = B + P — T.

This, of course, is merely an outline of the prin-
ciples upon which the solution depends. In practice,
various simple expedients are adopted for facilitating
the calculations, which may be very quickly made in
the note book, or in many cases mentally. The al-
gebraic signs of all the elements must be kept care-
fully in mind ; for example, if the aiming point is in
rear of the line of guns, as is usually the case, the
value of P is given the negative sign.

If the direction of the aiming point is very far
from the normal to the battery front, a correction must
be applied to these results, since the measurement of
an angle in mils is accurate only when the successive
lateral displacements are laid oflf as tangents to a circle
of which the range is the radius, — or, what is nearly
the same thing for small angles, on a single tangent
thereto. This correction is made by multiplying the
distance between the directing gun and the battery
commander^s station, by the trigonometric sine of
the angle between the battery front and the line
from telescope to aiming point, and using this ** vir-
tual distance" in place of the true one. A similar
correction is necessary if the battery commander's
station is very much in front or rear of the line of
guns, or if the battery front is very oblique to the
.line of fire; in practice, however, these last correc-
tions are seldom necessary. In applying corrections,
use may be made of correction tables, which are

often carried in complete form. A brief table, giv-
ing only a few values, is engraved on the back of the
battery commander's rule, mentioned above ; another
plan is to use the following table, showing the angles,
in mils, corresponding to the natural sines, o.i, 0.2,
etc., which, being very brief, may easily be carried
in the note book, or memorized :

Angle, Nat.

Mils. Sin.

102 O.I

205 0.2

310 0.3

421 0.4

533 0.5

655 'V 0.6

790 !. 0.7

945 ••• 0.8

1 141 09

It is true that one important element in this cal-
culation, range, is not certainly known, but only ap-
proximated. However, with the battery commander's
station near the battery, the error in range finding
must be very considerable to cause a serious error in
the angle. And if it be objected that the process is
too long and intricate, it must be remembered that it
is usually done at leisure, before the enemy can have
any knowledge of the position or even of the presence
of the battery, which remains in concealment. It
has for its object the accurate placing of the first shot,
in order to facilitate observation and ranging; and if
it can accomplish this, the time is well spent, since
after the first shot the enemy has his warning. If
there is need of haste, the process can be abbreviated

• 68

as much as desired, by sacrificing some of its ac-
curacy.

Another method is to use the telescope itself as a
provisional aiming point. In Fig. 7, considering only
the triangle GBT—

G + B + T = 180° = 3,200 mils
... G = 3,200 mils — (B + T)

B can be measured with the telescope, and T
computed as before; G thus becomes known. The
guns being once directed upon the target, an aiming
point other than the telescope may be used if desired,
its angular distance from the telescope being read by
each gunner independently, from his gun sight.

The angle of site has next to be measured. Since
the gunner cannot, in general, see the target, this
cannot be done directly, but the angle of site at the
battery commander*s station can be measured with
the telescope, and corrected for difference of level
between gun and station. This angle is needed in
order that the clinometer of the range quadrant may
be set.

The firing data are now complete for the directing
gun; but before proceeding farther it is necessary to
determine how the fire of the other pieces is to be
distributed on the target.

The old method of distribution is still applicable
when the fire is direct. This is called ** individual
distribution,*' and consists simply in assigning to
each gunner a separate part of the target upon which
to aim.

In ** collective distribution," all the pieces have
the same aiming point, but the deflection set off on
the different sights is not the same, increasing or

decreasing from that of the directing gun in arithmet-
ical progression.

By changing the common difference of the series
the fire of the whole battery may be made to con-
verge upon a single point, or to diverge as much as
desired. The lines of fire of the pieces, thus dis-
tributed, constitute the ** sheaf of fire.**

In this method of distribution, indirect fire is
habitually used, but the method is also applicable to
direct fire, in which case the common aiming point is
some conspicuous part of the target.

The firing data for indirect fire then include the
following elements:

1. Deflection of right piece.

2. Deflection difference.

3. Angle of site.

4. Corrector setting.

5. Range.

With this information the battery is ready to
open fire. But as all the data are merely approxima-
tions, more or less close, it is not expected that the
guns will be on the target accurately at the first shot.
Hence the battery commander must correct his data
by what is called *'fire for adjustment." This may
be executed in three ways — by battery salvos, by pla-
toon salvos, and by piece. The method to be adopted
depends upon circumstances, such as the nature of
the target, the facility of observing the fire, the avail-
able supply of ammunition, etc.

Either shell, time shrapnel or percussion shrap-
nel may be used ; usually that projectile and fuze are
adopted which are intended to be used in the subse-
quent fire for effect. When time shrapnel is used

the first bursts are generally made lower than the
normal, to facilitate observation.

The principle of adjustment is, to establish a
** bracket**; that is, to get one group of shots over
and one short, and then narrow the limits of error as
much as circumstances require and time permits; at
the same time distribution and height of burst are
observed, and the necessary amount of accxxracy in
these elements obtained.

In adjusting by battery salvos, all the pieces are
loaded and laid as directed ; the guns are then fired
in turn, beginning at either flank, with an interval of
about three seconds between shots. The battery
commander then announces any necessary correc-
tions in range and height of burst, and makes such
alterations as he sees fit in the distribution of the
fire, either shifting the whole sheaf to the right or
left by changing the deflection of the right gun, or
opening or closing the lines of fire, like the sticks of
a fan, by changing the deflection difference. If a
single shot is out of its proper place in the sheaf,
the chief of platoon, in case of direct laying, makes
the necessary changes to place it correctly on the
next salvo ; in indirect laying the battery commander
makes this correction also.

Adjustment by platoon salvos or by piece is con-
ducted in the same way. except that a single platoon
or piece is designated to do the firing. The other
pieces are kept constantly laid with the firing data
last announced, but are not loaded. When the ad-
justment appears satisfactory, a battery salvo is gen-
erally fired for final verification.

**Fire for effect" is then taken up. This may be

conducted in four ways : — continuous fire, volley fire^
zone fire and fire at will.

Continuous fire is the old " fire by piece ** ; the guns
are fired in regular rotation from one flank of the
battery to the other, at such intervals as may be di-
rected.

Fire at will is used for close defense. Fuzes are
set at zero and sights at i,ooo yards ; each piece fires
as rapidly as possible, the gunner aiming only roughly.
The shrapnel bursting at the muzzle, the bullets are
effective up to 500 yards ; the elevation correspond-
ing to 1 ,000 yards is found to give a good distribu-
tion over the whole 500 yards depth. This proced-
ure establishes a beaten zone through which it is
almost impossible for troops to pass.

The other kinds of fire are delivered intermit-
tently, or by ** rafales.** This is a term borrowed
from the French drill regulations ; its technical sense
is explained by its literal meaning, a sudden, short
gust or squall.

A ** volley** consists of a specified number of
rounds, fired by each piece independently of the
others, as rapidly as is consistent with accuracy. It
may be fired either with or without ** sweeping.'*

In a volley *' without sweeping,*' the number of
rounds fired is variable, and is announced in the
command. All sights are kept directed upon the
target or aiming point during the firing, with no
change in the firing data. The breadth of the zone
which can be thus covered by a four-gun battery evi-
dently depends upon the spread of the bullets of the
individual shrapnel ; this varies with the range and
height of burst, but may be taken at 25 yards, giving

loo yards as the breadth of beaten zone for the bat-
tery.

To cover a broader zone, the sheaf of fire may be
shifted laterally after each volley or series of volleys ;
or sweeping fire may be used. To fire a volley
"sweeping,** the lines of fire of the pieces are first
caused to diverge, by properly apportioning the target
in case of direct laying, or by using a suitable deflec-
tion difference in case of indirect laying ; each sight
is then directed upon the right-hand portion of its
own target, or upon the aiming point, and the first
shot fired. The number of rounds is always four,
and after the first one no aiming for direction is
attempted ; the piece is traversed to the left after
each shot by a half turn of the hand wheel, which
changes the direction four mils. The volley being
completed, each piece is traversed back to its original
direction. The breadth of the zone covered by such
a volley depends upon the range; the maximum is
about 400 yards, at 6,000 yards range. At 3,000
yards, the breadth of the zone would be about 250
yards.

The depth of the zone covered varies considerably
with the range. A single ** well-adjusted** shrapnel,
— that is, one fired with the correct range and burst at
about the normal height of three mils, — covers effec-
tively 200 yards in depth, up to 3,000 yards range.
Beyond that range, the depth diminishes consider-
ably, since the angle of fall is steeper. At 4,500
yards, for example, the beaten zone of the single
shrapnel has fallen off to 125 yards.

On account of the errors of gun and fuze, of course,
the dispersion of several rounds is a little greater
than this. Experiments show that with volley fire.

two or tQore rounds per gun, we may expect a beaten
zone about 250 yards deep at 3,000 yards range, and
150 yards deep at 4,500 yards.

If, then, it is impracticable to range accurately, or
if the target has great depth, volleys must be fired at
several successive ranges. A convenient method of
doing this is to use '*zone fire,** in which each piece
fires three rounds at each of four ranges 100 yards
apart, or twelve rounds in all. The firing is com-
menced at the range given in the command, and
carried on continuously at each gun until the twelve
rounds have been fired, the chiefs of section directing
increases of range at the proper time without further
orders.

If this standard method does not satisfy the re-
quirements of the case, the battery commander uses
volley fire, changing his range at will from volley to
volley. By making his volleys ** sweeping,** he may
increase both the breadth and depth of the beaten
zone.

Of course such fire may cause great expenditure
of ammunition. This is drawn, in the first instance,
from the caisson placed beside each piece. From
time to time, as opportunity offers, it is replaced
from the caissons of the fifth section, one of which is
unlimbered on each flank of the battery. These,
when empty, are replaced by another caisson section
and sent back to refill, or exchanged for full caissons
from the ammunition column.

If necessary, the caissons of the gun sections draw
ammunition from their own limbers and from those
of the guns. This, however, is exceptional; the am-
munition in these limbers, especially in the gun

limbers, is regarded as an emergency supply,'and, if
used, is replaced at the earliest opportunity.

To minimize the danger of error, the commands
for firing, which contain the firing data, are always
given in a stereotyped form, the elements following
each other in a fixed order. First comes the desig-
nation of the target or aiming point ; then the method
of fire; then the firing data in the order above stated.
The last item is always the range ; announcement of
this is taken as an order to load.

Thus for a battery salvo the commands would be :

. Direct Laying,— {i) ** Target ." (2) '^By

battery from the right (or left).** (3) '* Deflection

.*' (4) "Corrector *' (if time shrapnel is

used; otherwise designation of projectile, ** Percus-
sion shrapnel," or "SheH**). f5) ** Range .**

Indirect Laying, — (i) '^Aiming point ." (2)

**By battery from the .** (3) '* Deflection .*'

(4) ** Increase,** (or ''Diminish**) "by .*' (5)

"Angle of site .** (6) "Corrector ,** (or des-
ignation of projectile). (7) "Range .**

The piece being loaded and laid, the gunner calls
" Ready ; ** the chief of section then faces the battery
commander and raises his right hand. When all
pieces are signaled ready, the battery commander
gives the command or signal "Commence firing;**
the signal is made by raising the hand and bringing
it sharply down to the side again. The pieces are •
fired in turn, from the flank designated, by command
of the chiefs of section.

In subsequent firing only such data is contained
in the command as it is desired to change; except
that the range is always repeated, this being the final
element and being understood as an order to load.

In firing other than by salvo, the commands differ
from those instanced above only in that part desig-
nating the kind of fire ; for example :

** Continue the fire, from the right (left), interval
seconds."

** Volley fire, rounds.**

"Volley fire, sweeping.**

*' Zone fire.**

In all volley and zone fire, and in fire at will, the
gunners give the command of execution; in other
cases the chiefs of section.

Chiefs of platoon repeat all firing data as given
by the battery commander, and in addition, in indi-
rect laying, announce the deflection setting for each
of their pieces.

^If more convenient the battery commander has
his chiefs of platoon report to him at his station be-
fore opening fire, and personally indicates to them
the target or aiming point. If time permits, he
sometimes has chiefs of section and gunners also re-
port, and communicates to them all or a part of the
firing data. If this is not done, the commands may
be given by megaphone or telephone.

The duties of the battery commander in the tech-
nical handling of his battery in action, are designated
by the term ** conduct of fire." The tactical man-
agement of the fire is called **fire direction." Usually
'* conduct of fire** is the affair of the battery com-
mander; **fire direction," that of the commander of
the higher unit. This matter will be discussed
further in the chapter on tactics ; but it will be con-
venient at this point to consider the means by which
both kinds of control are exercised.

It is all a matter of communications. The more

the means of communication are improved, the freer
are the commanders to post themselves where they
may get the best knowledge of the situation, and
their troops where they may best act. To eflfect the
communications necessary for its own internal man-
agement in action, without calling upon other troops
for aid, every artillery unit is provided with suitable
signal equipment, and has permanent details of
officers and men, trained in using it.

The signal equipment of all units includes *' buz-
zers" or other field telephones, and signal flags. In
addition each battery is provided with megaphones,
and each battalion and regiment with a heliograph
and an acetylene lantern. In laying telephone lines
the battery always uses buzzer wire and hand reels;
battalions and regiments are provided with both
buzzer and field wire, and have each a four horse
cart (or in mountain regiments two pack-mules) to
carry wire and instruments.

In each battery, the chief of the third platoon is
the ** reconnaissance and signal officer." His signal
detail consists of one corporal and four privates, who
are selected for their special aptitude and assigned
to the fifth section. The corporal has immediate
charge of the establishment of battery communica-
tions proper, — that is, communications of the battery
commander with his guns, or with an auxiliary ob-
servation station. The corporal and No. i of the
detail act as telephone operators on this line.

The battery is provided with a third telephone,
which is intended to be connected with the battalion
commander's line. No. 2 acts as operator on this line.

Nos. 3 and 4 are line guards, and are habitually

mounted. They are used as required, on battery,
battalion or regimental lines.

The battalion sergeant major, under the direction
of the battalion adjutant, is responsible for establish-
ing the battalion commander's line to the batteries,
and for assigning line guards ; he also acts as opera-
tor at the battalion commander's station. Each bat-
talion has a second telephone, which is used on the
regimental line, or to connect with an auxiliary ob-
servation station ; extra operators that may be re-
quired are assigned from the battalion scouts and
agents of communication, whose method of detail and
proper duties are explained in the next chapter.

The regimental line runs from regimental head-
quarters to each battalion, and to an auxiliary ob-
serving station if used When this line is required,
the regimental sergeant major, under direction of the
regimental adjutant, performs the same duties in es-
tablishing and maintaining it as just described for
the battalion sergeant major on battalion lines. He
assumes control over all line guards ; if an additional
operator is required, a regimental agent of communi-
cation (see next chapter) is assigned to him.

Rapid fire materiel, it will be seen, makes it pos-
sible to use artillery in ways which were impossible,
or very difficult, with older types, while it is still pos-
sible to use it in all the old ways. The question con-
sequently arises, how far should we alter our old
methods? Should we adhere closely to them, preserv-
ing the advantages of their simplicity, and treat the
new powers as a reserve, to be utilized in case of need?
Or should we pass frankly over to the new ideas, and
hold on to the old methods only for use in case the
more complicated new ones fail?

The French, the pioneers in this field, have
adopted the second plan. They make indirect' laying
a normal procedure ; it is recognized that positions in
the open will frequently be necessary or advisable,
but advantage is taken of a mask wherever possible.

It will be noted that the term mask, not protection,
is used. A masked or covered position, even when
the form of the ground itself furnishes the mask,
does not as a rule give actual protection, as is some-
times thoughtlessly assumed ; for when a position is
such that guns can fire out of it, other guns can cer-
tainly fire into it. Concealment is what is sought;
a battery well masked is exceedingly difiicult to lo-
cate, and from twelve to fifteen feet of cover will
conceal even the flashes of the guns.

The difficulty of finding a well concealed battery
is illustrated by the experience of Lieutenant Colonel
Patchenko's battery, the Second, of the Ninth East
Siberian Rifle Division, at the battle of Tashihchiao,
July 24, 1904. This battery fought for fifteen hours,
from 5 A. M. to 8 P. M., against six Japanese batteries,
which could not find complete cover, at times silenc-
ing them and compelling them to change position.
Not a shot reached this battery until, at 5 P. M.,
another Russian battery took position near it, with
less complete cover ; after this it suffered some loss
from shots directed at the other battery.

In the conduct of fire, also, the French habitually
utilize the peculiar properties of the rapid fire gun.
Colonel Gordon, of the English artillery, sums up
thus the principles upon which they work :

**The changes that have been introduced are
based on the supposition that a storm of shrapnel

bursting over a given area of ground will paralyze
every movement within that area. As the suddenness
of the squall is an important factor, time must not
be wasted in exact ranging, though every precaution
is taken to conceal the battery and make every pos-
sible preparation before the first shot is fired. -^^ ^ ^
The French theory is dependent on rapidity; they
count on hitting the enemy before he can hit back,
or knocking him down when he is not looking and
keeping him down; and to do this they sacrifice
exact ranging to rapidity, and trust to the storm area
including the enemy somewhere, and to its being
violent enough to reduce him to inaction."

The action of a French battery, it will be seen, is
intermittent. It opens fire suddenly, sufficient prep-
aration having been made beforehand to insure the
first shot being a fairly good one ; little time is then
spent in verification of the firing data, but rapid vol-
ley fire, progressive and sweeping, is distributed for
a few minutes over an area sufficiently large to in-
clude the target ; the fire then ceases for a time.

The German regulations represent the opposite,
.or ultra-conservative views. They still favor direct
fire as the habitual method, although ready to resort
to indirect laying on occasion ; their favorite position
is behind the crest of a hill, near enough the top to
enable the gunner to see the target through his
sights.

As regards methods of fire, the G-ermans continue
to hold to accurate ranging and steady, continuous
fire, both in order to economize ammunition, and to
spare the nerves of the gunners the strain of very
rapid firing except in special cases.

The tendency, even in Germany, however, is to-
ward further modification of methods ; and it seems
probable that the next edition of the German regula-
tions will reflect this tendency.

In the United States, prevailing ideas incline to-
ward the French rather than the German. The dis-
advantages of covered positions are recognized, but
the advantages also are fully appreciated ; hence the
effort is constantly to minimize the disadvantages^
by improvements in methods, so as to make it possi-
ble to get the advantages more frequently. The de-
sirability of acting by surprise, so as to get in effec-
tive shots before the enemy can do so, is accepted. It
is admitted that this may cause great expenditure of
ammunition, and hence great efforts are made to pro-
vide it. Efforts are also made to minimize this ex-
penditure by ranging as accurately as possible under
the circumstances of each case, but when time or the
difficulties of observation prevent great accuracy, no
hesitation is felt about opening zone fire with a very
wide bracket.

In this connection, a few figures as to ammunition
expenditure in the past may be of interest.

1813. Battle of Leipzig: Average for the Aus-
trian guns, 199 rounds per gun in the three days, or
66 per gun per day.

1863. Battle of Gettysburg : Federal average for
the 320 guns in action, 102 rounds per gun in the
three days, or 34 per gun per day. Greatest expendi-
ture reported by any one battery, 1,380 rounds in
three days, by battery **G,'* Fourth U. S. Artillery —
an average of 'j'j rounds per gun per day.

The Confederate reports are incomplete, but the
expenditure was approximately 100 rounds in the

three days for each gun engaged. The greatest re
ported expenditure by one battery was 882 rounds
for four guns, or 73 per gun per day.

1866. Greatest expenditure in one day by a Prus
sian battery, 180 rounds per gun, at Blumenau; by an
Austrian battery, 217 per gun, at Koniggratz.

1870. Vionville: Prussian average, 89 rounds
per gun; 35 per cent, of the batteries fired over 100
rounds per gun.

Gravelotte : Prussian average, 55 rounds per gun;
16 per cent, of the batteries fired over 100 rounds per
gun. French average, 90 rounds per gun ; 86 per
cent, of the batteries fired over 100 per gun, but no
battery fired more than the supply normally carried
with it in caissons and limbers.

1904. The expenditure was greatest on the Rus-
sian side. At the Sha-ho. the artillery of the Thirty-
fifth Division averaged 278 rounds per gun per day.
At Liaoyang, the artillery of the First and Third Si-
berian Corps averaged 420 rounds per gun per day.
Colonel Patchenko's battery, above mentioned, fired
at Tashihchiao 522 rounds per gun; this is the greatest
expenditure reported for a single battery on one day.

CHAPTER V.

DRILL REGULATIONS; INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATION.

Hohenlohe says, in his ** Letters on Artillery":
"Judging: from my own experiences in war, — and
you will own that in matters connected with artillery
they are fairly numerous, — the only movements
which are of use in the field are, the advance in col-
umn of route, deployments, and the advance in line/'

The spirit of this remark, if not the remark itself,
was in the minds of the writers of our present Pro-
visional Drill Regulations. Drill movements have
been limited to what seems an irreducible minimum,
and those that are retained are simplified to the
utmost. Paragraph i reads: '* Preparedness for
war is the goal to be kept constantly in view in all
peace training. No refinements of drill ground
instruction or other minor details must be allowed to
obscure this definite goal or impede progress toward
its attainment.** This idea is plainly in evidence
throughout the book.

It is unnecessary for present purposes to go into
details of battery instruction. For those who wish
to do this the drill book itself is the best source of
information. But to the description of methods of
fire which has already been given, it is desired to
add an explanation of the assembly, marching and

fighting formations, and of the methods of passing
from one to another, so as to enable one who sees
artillery maneuvering to understand what it is doing.
And to the discussion of signal communications will
be added some mention of the further means pro-
vided for maintaining connection between units, and
for obtaining such special information as is necessary
to enable artillery to act intelligently, efficiently, and
safely.

Caisson Corp Chief of Section

Section Colum-n
cc.(j|||k ts^M

Flank Column

Double Section

Formation of a Section
Fig. 8.

The basis of all drill movements is the section.
This, it will be remembered, may consist either of a
gun and caisson or of two caissons. It has three for-
mations, section column, flank column and double
section. (See Fig. 8.)

In section column one carriage follows the other
at two yards distance. In flank column the two
carriages are abreast, with seventeen yards interval.

In double section the two carriages are abreast, with
two yards interval. This last formation is peculiar
in that it is maneuvered as if it were a single carriage.
For example, if a section is in either of the other
formations, and the command ''left about** is given,
each carriage executes the movement separately, and
the relative order of the two is reversed ; but if it is
in double section, the pivot carriage executes the
movement as if alone, the other conforming to it, and
the relative position is preserved.

Double section is not only a convenient march
and maneuver formation, permitting the shortening
of the column by a half -v^henever its front, six yards,
is not too great, but it is a means of transition from
march to fighting formation.

It has been explained in the preceding chapter
that in the firing position the gun and caisson are
abreast, one foot apart, caisson on the left. It is evi-
dent, then, that much movement of the carriages by
hand is avoided by forming double section before
unlimbering; arid this is always done.

In unlimbering and limbering, the gunner is in
charge at the piece, aided by No. i ; No. 4 is in
charge at the caisson, aided by No. 5 ; Nos. 2 and 3
assist by manning the wheels of either carriage as re-
quired. When much movement by hand is necessary,
all the men work together, and move the carriages
successively.

The carriages may be unlimbered to fire in any
direction by the commands, ** Action front (rear,
right or left)."

If it is intended to fire to the front, double section
is formed with the caisson on the left. Upon un-
limbering, the caisson body is already faced in the

proper direction ; it is established on the desired
line, and determines the position for the gun. This
is turned about so that the muzzle points to the front,
and placed beside the caisson. Unless a trench is
dug to hold the trail spade, the gun is run a foot or
so ahead of its true position, to allow for the recoil
which takes place at the first shot, when the trail
spade has not yet buried itself.

To fire to the rear, the carriages are placed in
double section with the caisson on the right. When
the piece is unlimbered, its trail is lowered directly
to the ground ; the* caisson is turned about and placed
in the position thus determined for it, beside the gun.

To fire to a flank, double section is formed with
the caisson on either side of the piece. After un-
limbering, the carriage on the side toward which fire
is to be delivered is first established in position, and
all the cannoneers assist in bringing the other up to
its place.

In all these movements, it will be seen, the car-
riage which requires the less man handling is es-
tablished to mark the position, and the other then
placed beside it, in such a manner that, when the
movement is completed, gun muzzle and caisson
trail are pointing in the same direction, and the
caisson is on the left. To avoid confusion in tracing
out these maneuvers, it must not be forgotten that
the front of a carriage limbered is the direction in
which the horses are facing ; of a gun unlimbered, the
direction of the muzzle ; of a caisson unlimbered, the
direction of the trail.

The limbers, in service, are placed under cover
somewhere in the neighborhood, preferably on a
flank, out of the line of shots directed at the guns ; at

ceremonies, they are twenty-five yards in rear of the
line, facing to the front.

Before firing, and either before or after unlimber-
ing, the carriages must be ** prepared for action."
By this is meant, that the elevating and traversing
gear is unlocked and inspected; sights and quadrant
placed in position; shields unfolded and secured;
breech and muzzle covers removed ; and breech
mechanism examined. Before limbering, ** march
order'* is resumed.

The easiest way to limber is "front and rear.**
In doing this, the limbers approach their carriages
and separate, caisson limber passing across the front
and piece limber across the rear of the position.
When the limber axle is opposite the piece or caisson
trail, the limber is halted and swung ninety degrees
on its own ground, so that caisson horses are facing
to the front and piece horses to the rear, and then
backed slightly. This places them both conveniently
for limbering, without moving either carriage by
hand.

Often, however, this simple method is impracti-
cable, as, for instance, if the firing position is just
in rear of the crest of a hill, so that the caisson
horses would be exposed if they moved out in front
of their carriage. The section may then limber
**rear." The caisson is brought about, trail to the
rear; the piece is run to the rear ten yards. The
limbers move up to the trails of their respective car-
riages as before, but both are then swung around so
that the teams face to the rear. Running the piece
to the rear gives the necessary room for the caisson
team to maneuver in limbering.

The formations of the battery are, essentially,

only two — the sections abreast of each other, in line,,
or following each other in column. But several
varieties of each are distinguished, since the sections
themselves may be ia any one of the formations
above described.

The following descriptions of formations are
quoted from the Drill Regulations :

**373- The habitual formations are the order in
line^ the order in section column^ the order in flank column^
and the order in battery,

"374. The order in line is that in which the sec-
tions of the battery are formed abreast of each other
in the order, or the reverse order, of their numbers,
from right to left. The carriages are limbered, and
in each section are in section column, the pieces being
either in front or in rear of their caissons. In the
normal order in park the pieces are usually in front.

"If the carriages of each section are in double
section, the formation is called a double section line,

" 375- The order in section column is that in which
the sections of the battery follow each other in the
order, or the reverse order, of their numbers, from
front to rear. The carriages are limbered, and in
each. section are in section column, the pieces being
either in front or in rear of their caissons.

"If the carriages of each section are in double
section the formation is called a double sectio7i column,

"376. The order in flank column is that in which
the sections of the battery follow each other in the
order, or the reverse order, of their numbers, from
front to rear. The carriages are limbered, and in
each section are in flank column, the caissons being
all either on the right or left of their pieces.

''367- On subdivision for action, the battery is
divided into th^ firing battery, the reserve and the train,

** The firing battery comprises the first five sections.
It is under the immediate command of the captain.

"The reserve comprises the sixth, seventh and
eighth sections ; the store wagon ; the reserve men
and horses, and at least one pair of harnessed wheel
horses and one pair of harnessed lead horses. It is
commanded by the junior lieutenant, who is assisted
by the stable sergeant.

**The train comprises the forge, the kit wagons,
and the ration and forage wagons. It is commanded
by the quartermaster sergeant."

"377- The order in battery is that in which the
pieces and caissons of the gun sections, unlimbered
for action, are placed in line in the order, or the re-
verse order, of their numbers, from right to left;
the caissons of the fifth section, unlimbered, one on
each flank of this line ; and the limbers either in
rear of their unlimbered carriages, or formed at such
other place as the captain may direct.

*'The reserve, consisting of such other caissons,
etc., as may be present, is posted at the discretion of
the captain.

** 378. In line and in flank column, the normal inter-
val between carriages, measured between adjacent
wheels, is seventeen yards. In the order in battery
the interval is the same, but is measured between
adjacent wheels of gun carriages.

*'379. In column or in line, the distance between
two carriages, or between a carriage and a mounted
squad, is two yards, except that in flank column the
distance between caissons is four yards ; and, in line.

when the pieces lead, the distance between caissons
of the caisson sections is four yards. In battery,
when the limbers take post in rear of their carriages,
the distance between the line of pieces and the
limbers is twenty-fiv^ yards, measured from the rear
of the caissons to the heads of the lead horses."

Suitable means are provided for passing from one
formation to another, but only those aflFecting prep-
aration for action, formation in battery, and resump-
tion of march formation, seem to require mention
here.

Preparatory to going into action the command,
**Form and prepare for action," is given. Each car-
riage of the firing battery is prepared for action, and
the battery subdivided, as explained in Par. 367 of
the Drill Regulations, quoted above ; the reconnais-
sance and signal officer (chief of third platoon), and
the reserve and train commanders report to the bat-
tery commander for orders.

If the command is simply **Form for action," the
battery is subdivided, but the carriages remain in
** march order." This might be done, for example,
where it was desired to have reserve and train march
at the rear of the whole column, thus allowing the
infantry to close up forward.

Before urilimbering, the firing battery forms
double section line or column, — the former to un-
limber front or rear, the latter to un limber to a flank.
If the limbers are not to take their drill ground posi-
tion, in rear of the carriages, the battery commander
gives instructions to the first sergeant as to where
they are to be posted ; as soon as the carriages are un-
limbered the limbers wheel to the rear, clear the line

of guns, are formed in column by the first sergeant,
and conducted by him to their posts. Drivers are
then dismounted, and the senior caisson corporal
placed in charge; the first sergeant returns to the
firing battery. It is the duty of the non commis-
sioned officer in charge of the limbers to provide for
communication with the battery commander, so that
the limbers shall come up promptly at the command
or signal for limbering.

All mounted men with the firing battery dis-
mount ; their horses are led oflf by the drivers, except
those of the battery commander, first sergeant, musi-
cians and orderlies, which are kept near the battery
under cover.

In the absence of special instructions, the caissons
of the fifth section separate at the command for un-
limbering, and are placed on the flanks as already
described. The section is reassembled by its chief,
without orders, immediately after limbering.

If the battery has been limbered ** front and rear,'*
it may march in line to its original front at the com-
mand, *' Caissons front, March" ; the pieces execute a
right about and follow their caissons in section
column. In like manner it may march in line to the
rear at the command, ** Pieces front, March," or in
column to a flank at the commands, ** Flank column'*
(or "Double section"), '* pieces by the right (or
left) flank, March;" the caissons regulate the march
on the pieces, taking the designated formation. Hav-
ing limbered **rear," the march is taken up in a simi-
lar manner.

If it is desired simply to form the battery, without
marching off, the command is, "Form double section
line, March." If the battery has been limbered

** front and rear/* the caissons stand fast; the pieces
incline to the right, turn to the left about, and come
up on the right of the caissons. If the battery has
limbered *'rear," the pieces stand fast and the cais-
sons move up on their left.

The formations of the battalion and regiment are
simply combinations of those of the battery. The
normal interval between batteries in line or in battery
is twice that between sections of a battery; distance
between batteries in column, one carriage length.

In column of batteries, where each battery is in line,
full distance is battery front ; closed distance is carriage
length. A battalion in column of batteries at closed
distance is said to be in mass. Full interval in a line
of columns is battery length ; closed interval, carriage
length.

Between battalions all intervals and distances are
double those between batteries.

Some description has already been given of the
system of signal communications used within artillery
units, for fire direction and conduct of fire. But
these means are not sufficient to provide for the
necessary connection at all times between artillery
troops and commanders; hence men are detailed from
each unit as ''agents of communication." Further,
it is constantly found necessary to send men out to a
greater or less distance, to secure special informa
tion necessary to facilitate the movement or employ-
ment of artillery ; hence scouts are detailed in each
battery.

The men permanently assigned to these duties
are selected for their aptitude, and given special
training. The general training is naturally some-
what similar for both classes, and, as each may often

be called upon to perforin the duties of the other, or
of the signal meti, all are instructed in all three kinds
of work.

The principle upon which agents of communica-
tion work is, that it is the business of every unit to
provide for communication with the next higher com-
mander. Each battery sends a corporal to report to
the battalion commander ; each battalion, a sergeant to
the regimental commander ; each regiment when in
brigade, an officer to the brigade commander. The
agent from the highest artillery command, whether
this be a battery or a brigade, reports to the com-
manding officer of the whole force.

An agent is distinguished by a red band on the
left arm. His general duties are to transmit orders
and information from the higher commander to his
unit ; his most important special duty, to mark the
route of the officer to whom he reports, when he
goes forward on reconnaissance.

This latter duty is of the highest consequence.
When a force of artillery is to come into action, its
commander generally precedes it, sometimes by a
long distance, to reconnoiter the position. It is nec-
essary, in order to avoid delays, that the batteries
follow at once; but the commander can not, in gen-
eral, give definite instructions as to the route to be
followed. Hence he posts men at points where doubt
might arise, to give directions as to which way to
turn.

Agents are used, if available, for this purpose.
If they are not present in sufficient number, scouts,
or other available mounted men, are used. In the case
of a battery acting alone, the battery commander
may have to attend himself to posting the men; for-

tunately, in that case, the route is usually not long.
In higher commands, it is the duty of the adjutant,
or, in his absence, of the sergeant major, to relieve
his chief of this care.

A man so posted, after performing the duty as-
signed him, rejoins the commander by whom he was
posted as rapidly as possible.

Besides the permanently detailed agents, special
details are often necessary. For instance, when ar-
tillery is subdivided for action, it is the business of
the reserve and train to keep in touch with the com-
mander of their unit. This they do by means of
agents, detailed for the purpose from their own
strength.

As scouts, two men are detailed from each battery,
— either two privates, or a corporal and a private.
They are instructed by the battalion adjutant, and
generally act under his direction ; but when a battery
is detached its scouts accompany it, and when several
battalions are serving together the artillery com-
mander employs such of the scouts as he may require
under his own direction.

Their duty, like that of any other scouts, is to se-
cure information ; but the information that they are
trained to collect is such as has peculiar value to their
own arm. Reconnoitering parties sent out by the
commander of a mixed force will bring him the
information that he himself requires ; but in general,
when he has formed his plan and assigned the differ-
ent troops their parts in the execution of it, each unit
will find that it needs special information, which it
must get for itself. Artillery is even more dependent
upon such special reconnaissance than the other arms;
from tactical considerations, in that it acts at great

distances and against partially or wholly concealed
objectives; from technical considerations, since it
requires some information of peculiar kinds, which
would not be collected or even sought by a general
reconnaissance.

Artillery scouts generally work in pairs; sometimes
singly, and sometimes, on important missions at a
distance, in parties under a reconnaissance officer.

Often they accompany the leading elements of the
advance guard, or the advance cavalry ; at other
times they work independently. They are sent out
to find and report on roads and artillery positions ; to
locate targets upon which" the artillery is to fire, and
report dispositions in the vicinity of the target, either
of friendly or hostile troops ; or to observe the effect
of fire, when that can not be done by the commander
himself. They are posted to give warning of the
approach of hostile parties; in exceptional cases,
when artillery is in an exposed position, with little
or no protection from other arms, it may have to rely
entirely upon them for such warning.

From the above outline of the service of informa-
tion and communication, it will be seen that this ser-
vice is receiving a great deal of attention, more than
ever before. The difficulties to be overcome in hand-
ling guns constantly increase, with the extension of
the battlefield and with the increase in the power
and range of the guns themselves;, but by proper
organization of this service the artillery hopes to be
able to respond promptly and efficiently to demands
upon it. -and to avoid, ordinarily, calling upon other
troops for anything more than the protection of their
presence

CHAPTER VI.

TACTICS.

The preceding chapters have been devoted chiefly
to technical matters; but the whole object of the
technical discussion has been to lead up to the sub-
ject of tactics. This subject is so broad that only a
few hints can be given here.

There is sometimes an impression that artillery is
a purely technical arm, and has little use for tactics in
the broader sense. It seems at first sight that it has
only to move forward in some sort of decent order,
which is a matter merely of drill regulations, and
then take up a suitable position and open fire, both
of which duties require a knowledge more technical
than tactical.

It is true that the movements required of artillery
on the battlefield are simple, and that the guns are
worse than useless if there be a lack of the technical
knowledge necessary to establish them in position
and range them properly; but tactical knowledge in
the broader sense is required to control all these
operations. Not only must all be skillfully com-
bined to accomplish the given tactical purpose, but
the manner of combination must be coordinated with
the corresponding operations of other troops; for
artillery is an auxiliary arm, and its business is to
assist and support its infantry.

Thus there arises a complete system of artillery
tactics, or, more properly, a system for the tactical
handling of artillery, consisting of the principles by
which a commander should be guided in making
these combinations of technical operations.

The guns themselves must indeed be moved and
fought; this is the technical fotlndation, and this
duty falls in the main upon the battery commander.
But as General Langlois says, a tool is valuable only
when skillfully used, and tactics must always stand
above mere technique. As we follow up the chain
of command, to the chief of artillery and the com-
mander of an army, the technical duties become of
less and the tactical duties of greater consequence.

Naturally enough, such a tactical system is deeply
affected by changes in technical methods, and these
methods must always adapt themselves to the ma-
teriel with which they have to deal. Now artillery
materiel has been greatly changed in the last few
years, and the methods of working it have changed
with it. The question naturally arises whether the
whole system of artillery tactics has not thereby been
overturned, necessitating the development of an
entirely new one ; and many students of the subject
have been inclined to answer in the affirmative.

But this view seems a trifle one sided. It takes
account only of the improved tool, not of the un-
changed purpose, which is to help the infantry to
win battles.

The artillery gives this help always by fire action.
The methods of generating the fire are now widely
different from those of a few years ago, and its power
is much increased ; but the nature of the fire itself is
the same. Prima facie, then, ought we not to expect

to find the old system of tactics modified, rather
than revolutionized?

A great deal of study is naturally being given the
question now, when the rearmament with rapid fire
guns is approaching completion throughout the
world; and as usual there are extremists on both
sides — ultra-conservatives and ultra-radicals. But it
is believed that in the final solution of the problem
the old broad principles will be found to remain,
the details being modified to conform to the altered
conditions. Study of the Japanese regulations, under
which such excellent work has been done in the late
war, supports this belief.

Since artillery always fights in line, and at a halt,
the choice of position becomes of paramount impor-
tance. The convenience with which indirect fire may
now be employed makes it much easier to put up
with a poor position than formerly, and renders it
possible to use guns with some effect from almost
anywhere within range of the target ; but most of
the old rules for choice of a position still hold good,
and the best position will be the one which most
nearly satisfies the requirements of those rules. The
following are the principal things to be sought:

1. Good cover; a ridge behind which guns may
be placed out of sight, is usually sought; but trees,
bushes or high standing grain, completely concealing
the battery, are also good.

2. Clear, open ground to the front and flanks,
giving the greatest possible range and the broadest
possible field of fire.

3. Good stations for the observation of fire.

4. Good aiming points, in case of indirect laying.

5- A front generally perpendicular to the line of
fire.

6. Sufficient space to allow the deployment of all
the batteries that it is desired to use.

7. Firm soil, to resist the wear and tear of the
firing.

8. Easy access from the rear, convenience of
moving to the front, and good lateral communication
— all under cover.

The relative importance of these desiderata de-
pends upon circumstances — upon the purpose in
view, the nature and extent of the target, and the
dispositions of friendly troops.

The most careful reconnaissance possible should
be made before deciding upon a position. Dis-
mounted as well as mounted examination ot the
ground should be made; and observation from the
direction of the enemy is very desirable.

Such reconnaissance is easily made in the case of
deliberate occupation of a defensive position. But
on the march the matter is not so simple, for such
work takes time. If the advance guard meets with
serious opposition, and it is necessary to bring up
artillery to its assistance, the artillery commander
will not be able to do very much before his guns are
ready to come into action.

In order to facilitate this reconnaissance, as well
as to assist in locating positions of the enemy, it is
advisable to have an artillery officer, under the im-
mediate orders of the artillery commander, march
with the leading elements of the advance guard.
His special duty is to look for places favorable to the
action of artillery.

On reaching such a position the officer halts and

makes a careful study of the ground. He notes its
advantages and disadvantages ; estimates the number
of batteries which could be used with convenience ;
notes desirable locations for observation stations;
selects, and determines distances to, convenient aim-
ing points ; locates any important features shown on
the map ; picks out the places where an enemy might
probably appear ; and in fact, conducts as complete a
reconnaissance as time will permit at each position as
he reaches it.

Several good men should accompany him as scouts
and orderlies ; by means of these men he keeps in
communication with the artillery commander, sending
back such memoranda as seem of special importance.

Thus, when the batteries do have to come into
action, the commander will find his reconnaissance
well under way, and the officer will be prepared to
help him complete it in the shortest possible time.

Given a position, it may be occupied in various
ways. The guns may be unconcealed ; they may be
placed with sight defilade — that is, in such a way that
the gunners can just see the target through the
sights ; or they may be completely masked, even to
such an extent that the flashes are concealed.

The permissible distance from the covering mass
depends upon circumstances, and is generally not
very great. If, for instance, the covering mass is a
hill, and there is a possibility that the guns may have
to sweep its forward slope, they must be near enough
to the crest to permit them to be run up promptly.
Again, if the distance is great, it is often impossible
to find a suitable observation station near the guns ;
this is a serious objection to a battery commander
acting alone, but less so in the case of a larger body,

100

since the higher commanders have less need to be
close to their guns.

If there is no reason why it should not be used,
a position far behind the mask has the advantage of
being very difficult for the enemy to find. Even if
he determines the direction, and ranges on the cover-
ing mass, he may fail to sweep far enough behind it.
Major Reichmann, in his report of observations in
Manchuria, gives the following example of a position
of this type :

'* At Liaoyang two batteries of the First Siberian
Corps stood on perfectly open ground in front of
Shushan Hill, and small shelters had been dug for
the men ; 700 yards in front was a low round hill en-
trenched for infantry, which hid the batteries from
view. Immediately in rear of the batteries rose Shu-
shan Hill, and some distance up the slope was a Rus-
sian artillery colonel with an observing party, who
regulated the fire of the batteries below by means of
a megaphone. Though standing perfectly in the
open, these two batteries did not suffer much, simply
because the enemy's guns did not find them, in spite
of a furious bombardment."

Positions may be further classified according to
the purpose for which they are occupied. If the sit-
uation is clear, batteries may be placed in position
for the purpose of opening fire at once. If the time
for opening fire has not yet arrived, but is thought
to be near at hand, and the approximate direction of
the target can be foreseen, the batteries may be
placed in observation ; that is, they may be unlimbered
and prepared for action, and firing data determined
for prominent points in the field of fire. Trial shots

101

may be fired for partial verification of the data. This
process of preparation is called registration of fire.

If the direction of fire cannot be foreseen, posi-
tions may not be occupied, but merely selected.
Preparations are then made to fire from any one of
several positions, but the guns held limbered at some
convenient place until further developments. They
are then said to be in waiting.

If possible, positions should be occupied unseen
by the enemy. Battles nowadays are likely to last
several days, and take on something the character of
siege operations ; so that positions may often be oc-
cupied under cover of darkness. The guns may
then remain silent and concealed until the time
comes for their use, when they may enjoy the ad-
vantage of acting by surprise.

Changes of position are undesirable ; the guns are
useless and vulnerable while in motion, and time is
lost in ranging at each new position. Hence changes
should not be made when it can be avoided ; as will
be seen later, however, some few changes during the
course of the action will ordinarily be necessary.
Even changes of target * are to be avoided when
practicable ; a battery cannot shift its fire instantly,
and unless the fire has been registered beforehand it
will be necessary to range again.

The fire of all the guns is under the general su-
pervision of the artillery commander; but the methods
of carrying out his orders are left to the subordinate
commanders. Fire should not be opened without
his order ; and generally no subordinate should fire
at a target other than that designated by him, al-
though of course the subordinates may use their dis-
cretion as to the target in case of emergency.

102

As to the objective of the fire, the rule of our old
Drill Regulations holds good: **As a general rule,
the fire of artillery is directed against that arm of the
enemy which at the time is predominant, or which is
capable of .inflicting the greatest loss on the infantry
or cavalry which the artillery is supporting/'

Ordinarily no special escort is assigned to artillery.
It is the duty of all troops near it to provide for its
security.

In treating tactical subjects it is customary to con-
sider offensive and defensive action separately. The
line thus drawn is to some extent an arbitrary one,
for offense and defense shade into each other almost
imperceptibly. But the form of battle assumed as
typical — that in which one army occupies a purely de-
fensive position and the other attacks it — does furnish
an opportunity to discuss methods, which may after-
ward be modified and applied to conditions as found.

Following this custom, one may trace the probable
course of the artillery in such a battle, first from the
standpoint of the attack, then from that of the de-
fense.

A determined attack lipon a prepared position
must be preceded by a long period of reconnaissance,
the attacking force gradually feeling out the position
and locating the weak points.

This is a more difficult matter now than ever
before, since it must be managed from a greater dis-
tance. The defense will undoubtedly have numerous
small detachments in front of its main position, some
of them provided with artillery, to delay and possibly
mislead the attack. Each detachment will have to
be looked after separately, and the result will be a
series of minor actions, largely fought by the artillery

103

— for the detachments will not wait for their opponents
to come to close quarters. The issue of each such
small attack will not be doubtful; but each one must
be begjun with much the same caution as a general
engagement, for it will never be certain beforehand
just when and where the main position will be
reached.

For this reason, most of these preliminary at-
tacks will have to be preceded by the assembling
of a formidable number of guns, all of which will
be prepared to come into action at once upon the
hostile batteries as soon as located. Care must
be taken not to bring them under a decisive fire,
either artillery or infantry, or they will suffer a loss
totally out of proportion to the results to be obtained.
Opportunities for enfilade fire will be frequent in
this kind of work, and must not be wasted.

The guns may also, in* this stage, have occasion
to fire upon the enemy's infantry. The attacking
infantry will be constantly working forward and
occupying successive positions, which can, if neces-
sary, be defended against counter attacks. If these
positions be occupied or commanded by the enemy,
the artillery must aid the infantry to get possession
of them.

Finally, perhaps after days of skirmishing, the
reconnaissance period will approach an end. The
enemy's heavy guns will begin to be felt, and the
attacker's corresponding arm will seek positions from
which to reply. The fire of the opposing field guns
will grow stronger, and the front covered by them
broader. It will be found no longer possible to con-
tinue the tactics of flanking out or driving in separate
detachments, and gradually the main defensive posi-

104

tion will outline itself, and the weak points become
apparent.

It is to be supposed that the attacker is the
stronger in artillery ; this is indicated in the assump-
tion of the oflFensive. Throughout the combat it is
for him to utilize this superiority by always having
the preponderance at each point of contact.

So now, as in the reconnaissance period, he con-
centrates his guns. This does not mean that every-
thing he has must be drawn up in one grand line,
but simply that the diflFerent units are so placed that
each one can bring its fire effectively upon the desig-
nated target. The units themselves may be widely
separated ; but they are all held in the hand of the
commander, more firmly than ever before, by means
of the field telephone.

How far the physical separation of the units may
go without impairing their tactical concentration, de-
pends on the terrain and on the circumstances of
each particular case. In a small force, batteries may
have to stand alone ; but they should never be divided,
and if it is at all possible battalions should be kept
well together.

The battery commander will usually have his
hands full with the technical conduct of the fire of '
his battery. . The tactical application of it belongs
to the higher commanders. If, then, the battery be
isolated, a double duty will fall upon the captain, and
in proportion as he devotes his attention to one he
must neglect the other.

Nevertheless it is true, as just remarked, that con-
centration of guns does not mean the formation of a
continuous line ; it means the control by one com-
mander over many units, and the careful distribu-

105

tion by that commander, to the units, of particular
targets or fields of fire ; it means unity of action.

The phase of the combat now opening is the
artillery duel. It is important for the attacker to
cripple the enemy's artillery, his long range arm, as
much as possible before it can injure his infantry
seriously. Referring to the general rule already
given for the objective of artillery fire, we find these
conditions: — it is necessary for the infantry to ad-
vance ; at the outset, it is the artillery of the enemy
that is most dangerous to it ; therefore, that artillery
becomes the target for the attacking guns.

It is thus desirable for the attacker to seek a gen-
eral artillery engagement. For this purpose, he
should deploy as many guns as can be used, at the
outset, so as to avoid any risk of letting the defender
enjoy even a temporary superiority. Enough bat-
teries to cover the enemy's whole line with an effec-
tive fire should be placed in position, ready for in-
stant use. Each unit in this mass should have its
own field of fire allotted to it, and have orders to
reply to any battery which may be discovered within
that field. All being ready, fire is opened upon such
batteries as have been located, and an attempt made
to force the defender to disclose his whole artillery
position. If he be slow to do this, deliberate ex-
posure of a battery here and there may be of use, for
*' visibility draws fire."

To get decisive results a concentration of fire is
necessary, and this concentration the attacker should
usually be able to make. Keeping the enemy actively
engaged, as just indicated, he may concentrate all
his available remaining guns upon a single hostile
unit, and silence it. The concentration will then be

106

made upon another unit, that already silenced being
left to the batteries assigned to observe that particu-
lar part of the field.

It is a difficult thing to secure the necessary unity
of action, but when it is not secured the artillery
generally fails to accomplish its task. Thus at Mal-
vern Hill the Confederate artillery came into action
a battery or two at a time, and a large part of it never
got into action at all. This was partly due to the
difficulty of finding and reaching positions, and
partly to defective organization, which interfered
with proper control; but the result was that the
compact masses of Federal artillery had no difficulty
in dealing separately with the small forces succes-
sively sent against it.

The Prussians found the same difficulty in 1866.
Their batteries were generally too far to the rear, so
that they came upon the field late and in small groups.

Formerly, the artillery duel .was a very distinct
phase of the battle, and no infantry ventured within
range of the enemy's guns until a decided superiority
was established over them. But now artillery range
is so long that infantry must come within it. even
while the duel is at its height, if it is to reap any ad-
vantage from the cannonade during its advance.

The duel, then, shades gradually into the next
phase, which is the preparation of the infantry attack.

It may, in fact, prove impossible to draw the de-
fender into an artillery duel. If he chooses to keep
his guns silent and concealed, the attacker has no
choice but to send his infantry forward regardless of
them. While this arm is seeking to gain a lodgment
within striking distance of the position, the de-
fender's artillery will be forced to open fire upon it ;

107

his position being thus disclosed, his fire may be
answered in kind.

But, however this may be, when the infantry ad-
vances to the attack a new duty imposes itself upon
the artillery. It has now to prepare the approach to
the particular point selected for attack.

It must direct as severe a fire as possible upon
that point, -to keep down infantry fire. But at the
same time it can not neglect the hostile guns, or the
advantage gained by its previous work will be lost.
The duel^will have been fought at long ranges — prob-
ably at least 3,000 yards, perhaps much more. If prac-
ticable, the attack will come in to somewhere near
this range, for the efficiency of shrapnel fire falls oflF
rapidly beyond it ; but the war in Manchuria furnishes
instances of artillery fighting, and eflFective fighting,
too, at 7,000 yards. At such ranges the possibility
of putting permanently out of action the opposing bat-
teries, concealed from view and having their personnel
protected by shields, will be remote. They may be
silenced or forced to slacken their fire, but if left to
themselves they would soon be able to resume it.

A division of the artillery force thus becomes
necessary. Certain batteries, including usually the
heavy guns, are assigned to keep down the enemy's
artillery fire, while the remainder devote themselves
to preparing the infantry attack.

Those told off to the former duty will continue
to act very much as in the duel period, except that,
the opposing fire having slackened, each battery can
take care of a larger sector. When the enemy per-
ceives what is being done, he will probably intensify
his fire again as much as possible, and a second con-
test similar to the duel will take place. For this

108

reason, care must be taken not to draw oflF too many
batteries, and those that remain will have to exert
themselves to the utmost. Rapid volley fire will be
opened instantly upon any hostile battery that re-
news its fire.

The positions of the batteries constituting the
target will by this time be well known, and such fire
can be made eflFective immediately. If those bat-
teries change position, their fire, when reopened, will
not be dangerous at first, so time will be available for
ranging on them. It will be difficult for them to act
by surprise in their new positions, for each part of
the defender s line will be under close observation by
some battery told off for that particular purpose, and
they will be very quickly detected.

The batteries intended to prepare the infantry as-
sault gradually withdraw from the duel, as they can
be spared, and prepare to concentrate their fire upon
the point selected. All possible preparations are
made for opening fire, and ranges determined as ac-
curately as possible, so that the fire, when opened,
may be effective from the first.

All then open simultaneously, and keep down
the defender's fire over the whole front of the attack.

It has just been said that the heavy guns will
naturally be found among the batteries observing the
enemy's artillery positions. But use for them may
be found at times among the preparation batteries.
It may become necessary or desirable to destroy ma-
terial obstacles in the way of the attacking infantry,
and if these are serious the greater shell power of the
heavy guns will be pressed into service.

While all this is going on, the infantry is pushing
in and making its final dispositions for the decisive

109

attack ; and when the preparations are completed the
assault is launched. The duty of the artillery now
changes from preparation to support.

The support of the attack consists of two things.
The first is, keeping down the fire, both artillery and
infantry, from that part of the line against which the
assault is directed ; the second, guarding the flanks
of the attacking force.

For the second purpose, certain batteries are
designated, either from those that have been assist-
ing in the preparation, or from those that have been
taking care of the enemy's artillery. The flanks of
an attacking force are very vulnerable, and the enemy
will undoubtedly try to take advantage of this, either
by counter attacks directed against them, or by fire
action from favorable points outside of the threatened
section.

In order to give the necessary protection, the bat-
teries assigned to this duty act much in the manner
of those which maintained the artillery duel after the
preparation of the attack had begun ; that is, each
battery is assigned its field of fire, and makes its
preparations to act instantly and vigorously against
any part of it, noting ranges to prominent places, se-
lecting its aiming points, and keeping a vigilant
watch of everything within its sector.

The guns which are told off to keep down the fire
in front maintain a vigorous fire over the heads of the
advancing infantry until the latest possible moment
before contact ; they then slightly increase their ele-
vation and lengthen their fuzes, and sweep the
ground just in rear of the enemy's firing line, pre-
venting reinforcement or withdrawal of it.

Just when the fire should be thus diverted from

110

the firing line is a delicate question. As fuzes, lay-
ing apparatus and observing instruments are im-
proved, this moment may be postponed ; but even so,
the answer is no mere matter of calculating the danger
space and ceasing the fire when the troops reach the
near edge of it. The moral effect upon the infantry
has to be considered ; troops can not be expected to
advance with confidence very close to the real danger
line. On the other hand, if the fire ceases too soon,
the defenders will be able to redouble the intensity
of their fire. Many infantry officers say that they
prefer to take some chances of getting a few shells
among them from the rear, rather than dispense
prematurely with the support of the artillery.

The following computations will give an idea of
the technical side of the question.

Take, as a typical case, accurately adjusted shrap-
nel fire over level ground at a single line of targets,
with the 3-inch field gun and service ammunition.
Calculating from range table velocities and angles of
fall, from an average spread of the shrapnel bullets,
and from mean errors of the fuze as determined by
experimental firing in 1906, we find the probabilities
for a 3,000 yard range to be as follows :

Nineteen per cent, of the shrapnel will burst on
graze.

Twenty-five per cent, will burst less than 9 yards in
front of the target, all of which distance is danger
space for men standing.

Fifty per cent, will burst less than 66 yards from
the target; danger space, 45 yards.

Seventy- five per cent, will burst less than 1 1 1 yards
from the target ; danger space, 84 yards.

Ill

Ninety per cent, will burst less than 163 yards from
the target; danger space, 103 yards.

Ninety five per cent, will burst less than 190 yards
from the target; danger space, 118 yards.

Ninety-nine per cent, will burst less than 242 yards
from the target; danger space, 149 yards.

It has been laid down as a general rule that the
fire must cease when the infantry comes within 500
yards of the target. But if this rule be followed, the
artillery might almost as well not support the attack
at all. The German drill regulations reduce this
distance to 300 meters ; and some observers of the war
in South Africa have insisted that it must be reduced
to 100 yards:

If, as is probable, the approach to the position is
up a slope, or if the guns themselves occupy an
elevated position, the fire may safely be continued
longer than on level ground. And even when the
guns have to increase their elevation, the howitzers,
owing to the steep angle of fall of their trajectory,
may continue to fire almost up to the moment of the
last rush. This, it will be noted, is one of the most
valuable uses of howitzers, and they should always
be represented among the batteries assigned to this
duty.

As a guide to the artillery in this difficult matter,
there must be some means of communication with
the assaulting infantry. When artillery officers are
available for the purpose, they may be sent out to
keep their immediate commanders informed, follow-
ing the infantry line, selecting successive stations
from which they may observe its progress, and re-
porting by telephone or other signal system. The
Japanese custom of carrying flags with the attacking

112

lines gave their artillery excellent information as to
the position of the infantry, which was almost indis-
tinguishable otherwise. If satisfactory means of
communication can be devised, it would seem that
the immediate commander of the attacking infantry
should be the man to select the moment for divert-
ing the artillery fire.

The essential thing, however, here as throughout
the action, is close cooperation between the artillery
and the infantry. If the two arms do not act together
the defender can take cover, wait until the artillery
fire ceases, and then man his works to meet the in-
fantry assault. This is exactly what happened at
Liaoyang. where the Japanese bombarded the Shu-
shanpu position with rapid fire from over 200 guns
for an hour ; but the infantry assault, made after this,
fire ceased, was repulsed.

Some of the supporting batteries will go in with
the infantry to close range, perhaps 1,000 yards or
less. Several reasons will compel this. For one
thing, the proper protection of the flanks may very
likely prove impossible except from close range ; if,
for example, the enemy should be able to place a
few flanking guns behind some obstacle, in such a
manner that they could not be reached by frontal
fire, they could cause great loss and confusion in the
attacking force if no artillery were present to reply
to them.

Another reason is the desirability of affording
moral support to the infantry during the advance,
through the presence of its ** indispensable com pan-,
ion." The French especially attach great impor-
tance to this feature, and regard it as essential
**that the infantry should feel the constant and im-

113

mediate support of the accompanying batteries, and
that these should reach the conquered position at the
same time as the infantry.'*

It is said that the shields now attached to the
guns render it possible to serve them under fire from
closer ranges than formerly, in spite of the increased
power of that fire ; and that consequently the bat-
teries should not hesitate to go in, more particularly
as they, together with the infantry, will be under the
powerful protection of the guns which remain behind,
firing over their heads.

All this is quite true, as far as it goes, but it does
not touch the real objection to this procedure of send-
ing in the guns. The professed object is moral sup-
port ; but if the guns make long stops to fire, and in
so doing utilize the protection of their shields, they
will soon lose touch with the infantry. If, on the
other hand, they make several changes of position,
advancing step by step with the infantry, they will,
at each halt, waste at least a short time in ranging ;
moreover, during these movements, they will lose so
many horses that they will soon be permanently
stopped. In either case the moral support vanishes.

There is something in the idea of moral support,
but it ought not to be emphasized too much. Bat-
teries must be sent in to close range, for this and
other reasons, but it should be done with judgment,
and after due consideration whether the conditions
require it — not as a matter of course. The guns can
not remain immediately with the infantry in any
case, if they are to do any firing ; and it would seem
that their fire ought to have much the same moral
effect upon their own infantry, whether delivered
from a position 500 or 2,000 yards in rear of it. And

114

if it is a mere question of fire effect upon troops in
position, a range of 3,000 yards is as good as 1,000,
provided the observation of fire is satisfactory ; some-
times better, in fact, for the greater angle of fall of
the projectiles enables them to search cover better.

Such an advance at this stage can not be made
off-hand. It having been decided that it is to be
made, the ground over which it is to pa^ss will have
to be thoroughly, although rapidly, studied, positions
and the routes to them selected, and every possible
means taken for security. The number of batteries
to be sent should also be considered, in view of the
terrain and the object of the movement.

In executing the advance, batteries should move
successively, so as not to cause a complete cessation
of fire at any time. Each part of the force should
advance under the protection of the fire of some
other part.

A most striking warning against a faulty execu-
tion of this advance is found in the battle of Colenso.
General Hildyard's brigade, which advanced directly
upon the town, was supported by two field batteries
and six naval guns. As the infantry advanced,
Colonel Long, commanding the artillery, ordered his
whole force forward. The field batteries, more
mobile than the naval guns, got far ahead of their
own infantry, came into action within 800 yards of
the Tugela River, and found themselves under a
terrible fire, not only from infantry and artillery on
the hills beyond the river, but also from infantry on
the hither bank. Nearly all the horses were killed ;
the guns were fought in splendid style until most of
the men were gone, when they were abandoned, and
the remaining men sought shelter in a small ravine

115

150 yards to the rear. An attempt by the infantry
to save the guns failed, and all but two were left be-
hind when the British withdrew. These two were
saved only by the most extraordinary exertions and
at enormous cost.

This incident has been dwelt upon at some length
on account of the many lessons it teaches. First, the
artillery preparation was insufficient, the guns mov-
ing up before the infantry was within striking distance.
Next, the naval guns did not cover the advance of
the field batteries, but all were in motion at the same
time. Finally, the reconnaissance had not been
thorough, and when the batteries approached the
river they were surprised by fire in their front and
right flank, from riflemen whose presence on the
hither side of the river was not known. **It was
magnificent, but it was not war."

If the attack succeeds, and the enemy is driven
from his position, the victor has first to occupy and
hold. the captured ground, and then to make the most
of his advantage by a vigorous pursuit. The first
thing to be done is to complete the enemy's rout
— prevent a counter attack,'and make as difficult as
possible the formation of a rear guard.

Artillery will be pushed into the position as
swiftly as possible, to support the infantry now in
the act of occupying it. This is an instance where
subordinate artillery commanders, occupying ad-
vanced positions, should move up at once without
waiting for orders.

The batteries farther to the rear come up more
deliberately, first seeing that the ones ahead have
made good their foothold in the captured position,
and supporting them in the event of a counter

116

attack. Meanwhile the cavalry and horse artillery
are working around the flanks, and preparing to begin
the pursuit.

These arms naturally take the largest share of
the work of pursuit. The field batteries assist in
so far as they are able, firing upon any bodies of the
enemy that seem inclined to make a stand ; but with-
out express orders they should not go far beyond
the captured position ; they should rather remain
there until the successful infantry has recovered from
the disorder brought about by its own victory. The
assistance of the guns may be needed during that
process.

In the pursuit, artillery should not waste time on
small or broken bodies, but should devote its atten-
tion to the main force. It should leave the capture
of prisoners to other troops ; it has no men to send
back with them, if taken.

If the attack is repulsed, the responsibility for
covering the withdrawal and checking pursuit rests
on the artillery, and primarily on the batteries which
are most advanced.

From the above description it will be seen that
several changes of position generally have to be
made in the course of the action. These positions
used always to be classified as, ( i ) the reconnoiter-
ing position, (2) the duel position, (3) the supporting
position.

This classification of positions must not, however,
be taken too literally, as a '* sealed pattern" order of
attack. Under some of these heads several changes
of position in one action may be included ; some of
them may be omitted entirely, or rather one position
may be made to serve for several purposes; some

117

batteries may have occasion to occupy all these posi-
tions in succession, others will make fewer changes,
or none at all.

It has been remarked above that changes of po-
sition are always undesirable ; and this is especially
true in the attack, since changes cannot be so readily
made under cover as in the defense. The diflBculty
increases as the range shortens, and in the later
changes little or no protection can be found.

Changes should be made by echelon, part of the
batteries moving under cover of the fire of the rest.
If, as is usual, the old position is on the reverse
slope of a hill, the best plan is to limber to the rear,
first running the guns back by hand if direct fire is
being used ; a more or less covered line of advance
to the new position may then be found, and tTie ne-
cessity of crossing the crest of the hill, on the sky-
line, avoided.

The suggestion is not uncommon, that the tactical
defensive has been the gainer by modern improve-
ments in weapons. This may be so to some extent,
but too much reliance should not be placed upon
suqh a theory. Meckel says :

** During a long period of peace there is generally
a tendency to forget the lessons of war ; to exagger-
ate the results of improvements in firearms and the
importance of formations ; and to attribute a certain
superiority to the defensive. In reality, no one form
of battle is superior to another. Their relative values
depend entirely upon the terrain and upon circum-
stances."

The battles in Manchuria would appear to support
Meckel's idea. The defense has indeed grown

118

stronger in the earlier stages of the battle, but when
it comes to the decisive point, improved weapons
really prove of greater value to the attacker.

The first step in battle is the establishment of
contact. Each party seeks to gain information as to
the force and dispositions of the other ; but obviously
the assailant is the more urgently in need of infor-
mation. Contact can be gained only by fighting, and
the defense here enjoys the advantage of seeing
without being seen, and of having a position care-
fully prepared beforehand. Later in the fight, these
advantages gradually diminish.

The one advantage that, in the nature of things,
always belongs to the defender is, that he can, in
the form of battle selected as typical, reconnoiter,
choose, prepare and occupy his position at leisure.

The general characteristics desirable in an artil-
lery position have already been noted. In defense,
places must be found from which the guns, without
in any degree impeding the infantry, may command
all available positions and cover in front, both to pro-
tect advanced positions held by friends, and to prevent
strong points being seized by the enemy. Provision
must also be made for flanking fire, which may be-
come highly important in the later stages of the in-
fantry attack ; here care is necessary, lest the flanking
positions be themselves flanked.

Every artillery commander, of whatever grade,
should carefully reconnoiter the ground assigned him.
Not only the position to be immediately occupied
must be examined, but several positions, having re-
gard to the probable necessity of changing position
during the engagement — for even in defense the ar-
tillery must make some changes, although better off

119

than the attack. When the infantry assault begins,
a new position will probably have to be taken up to
meet it ; and circumstances may compel other altera-
tions in dispositions.

Little entrenching is required by guns provided
with shields. If a position is to be occupied for some
time, however, some little artificial strengthening
may be done. Sandbags may be placed on the
ground, in the space under the shields, or piled up in
the gaps between guns and caissons. Epaulments
may be useful to protect from flank fire ; for the
shields give little protection against fire which comes
at an angle of more than thirty degrees from the
normal to the front.

It would seem superfluous to say that artillery
will often have to provide for its own security, by
sending scouts to reconnoiter the ground beyond its
immediate position ; but there is no lack of instances
where this precaution has been neglected, and bat-
teries surprised by other ifroops that have worked up,
concealed by some apparently insignificant fold of
the ground. But barring such surprise, artillery
need not fear any frontal attack. It is vulnerable in
the flanks only.

Malvern Hill may serve to illustrate this. The
Confederates could not reach the Federal guns. Ma-
gruder's division made three desperate attempts, but
failed. General D. H. Hill says that half the Con-
federate casualties were from artillery fire.

The flank of a line of guns is of course weak ; but
even here, if the force is small and the artillery has
a little warning, the attack may be beaten off. Thus
at Bull Run, General Hunt, then a captain, was in
command of his own battery, **M," Second Artillery,

120

and of Battery **G/' Third Artillery, six guns in all.
A force of Confederates appeared on his left, his bat-
teries being at the moment not engaged in front.
He, and the infantry near him, changed front to
meet the attack; after fifteen minutes of rapid
canister fire from the batteries, the enemy broke,
the Federal infantry not having had to fire a shot.
Hunt says in his report that he directed the men to
omit sponging the guns (all muzzle-loaders, of
course), and take the chance of premature discharge,
"for minutes were now of more value than arms.**
Fortunately, he was able to add that no accidents oc-
curred from this cause.

Corresponding to the advantage which the defense
possesses, in taking position at leisure, is the disad-
vantage that he must be prepared to meet all possible
attacks of the enemy. This constrains the defending
artillery to scatter its force more, to cover dangerous
places in the line. But the whole force must not be
scattered in this way, or every part of the line will
be weak. The most important points are occupied,
and the remainder of the artillery held back until
needed.

Control of fire is simpler in defense than in attack,
owing to the greater permanence of the positions.
The field telephone may be used to an even greater
extent. Regular range finding systems may be es-
tablished in the more important positions; a meas-
ured base line angle-measuring instruments at the
ends, and telephonic communication, are the essen-
tials of the system.

As remarked above, the first troops of the defense
to engage the enemy will probably be small covering
detachments in front or on the flanks. Advanced

]2l

posts, close to the main line, are not meant, but inde-
pendent bodies at a considerable distance. Just
before the battle of the Lisaine, for instance, General
von Werder had out several such detachments, some
of them as much as ten or fifteen miles to the west
and south, covering a front of some thirty miles.
Their use is two- fold. In the first place, they force
the enemy to deploy and show his strength, giving
valuable information to the defender in time for him
to profit by it. Secondly, they annoy him, causing
him to make constant, useless and costly attacks, and
gradually undermining the morale of his troops.

Such detachments should act in much the same
manner as a rear guard ; they should make a show of
resistance, but should not allow themselves to be
drawn into a serious engagement. This being so,
they should be strong in artillery, the long range
arm par excellence, and have only enough of the other
arms to protect the artillery.

Horse artillery accompanied by cavalry is emi-
nently suited for this work, but unless an army were
exceptionally strong in these arms, field batteries and
infantry, with only a little cavalry, would probably
be used in front, leaving the bulk of the more mobile
forces for the flanks. Here detachments so consti-
tuted may perform a double service ; they may do
all that is outlined above, and also attempt to lead
the enemy in a false direction. This is one of the
few cases where dividing a battery may be good tac-
tics. Swift and energetic, rather than powerful, ac-
tion is required ; sharp attacks from many points, in
quick succession, may keep the enemy in doubt as to
the force in his front.

All advanced parties will of course withdraw

122

before any serious attack is developed, but skirmishers
should be kept a few hundred yards ahead of the
artillery positions, so that the artillery need not be
distracted from its proper work to watch for local
attacks upon its own lines.

By reason of their long range, heavy guns will be
able to assist froin their main positions in the later
stages of the preliminary operations. These are
usually placed near the flanks, both in order to deal
with enveloping movements, and to cross their fire
upon a frontal attack. They should be well dispersed,
even batteries being sometimes divided. Their posi-
tions are more permanent than those of any other
gfuns, and the telephonic communication may be more
elaborated ; and the high power of the guns permits
their occasional use with good effect, singly.

It is not generally advisable to open fire at very
long range from the field guns in the main position ;
it is better to keep the enemy in doubt as to the loca-
tion of the batteries until he has come to fairly close
quarters. No definite rule can be given as to the
proper range, in yards, to be used ; but perhaps it
might be said that fire ought not to be opened, if it
can well be avoided, at ranges over 3,500 or 4,000
yards. The temptation is, of course, to fire too soon.
Even as good an artillery as the Austrians had at
Koniggratz could not resist it, and fired as soon as
the heads of the Prussian columns came in sight ; if
they had waited until larger forces were displayed in
the open, the effect of their fire would have been
much greater.

Each battery should have its own sector of fire
assigned as soon as the advanced detachments begin
to find the enemy, and should remain in observation

123

of ail targets appearing in it, until some one of them
come to easy range, or until eflfective fire is opened
from some battery within the sector. Each should
also be ready to support, if necessary, the batteries
on its flanks by turning its fire upon the sectors
allotted to them. Enough batteries should be in ob-
servation to cover thoroughly with fire all probable
lines of advance of the enemy ; not more, as this
would result only in disclosing more than is neces-
sary of the position. The remaining guns constitute
a temporary reserve, to be held limbered, ready for
use as the enemy's plans become clearer.

This does not mean that there should be any
hesitation in bringing batteries into action as soon as
there is any need for them, whether they be in ob-
servation or limbered up. All are gradually sent
itito the firing line ; there is no real reserve, as that
term is understood in the other arms.

Usually this process will result in a general en-
gagement with the attacking guns — the artillery
duel. In this, the defense, although probably the
weaker, may have a very good chance of success.
The method of opening fire gradually and progres-
sively, from concealed positions, may lead the enemy
to underrate the force opposed to him, and to send
his batteries into action before enough have been
collected. In such a case the defense might enjoy
temporarily an absolute superiority, and beat the at-
tacker in detail. In any case, he has the advantage
of a carefully chosen position, occupied at leisure,
and should be first in getting the range. If he can
handle the enemy's artillery severely enough, the
chances are that no infantry attack will be made.

It may often be to the defender's advantage, es-

124

pecially if he believes himself to be greatly inferior
in artillery, to decline the duel, and save his strength
for the infantry attack. With long range guns and
concealed positions, he may well succeed in holding
the enemy at arm's length, never letting him get
enough information about the position for a general
engagement. The attacker may then , perhaps, conceal
his own guns and play a waiting game — concentrate
upon each battery as it is discovered, and finally force
the defense to open fire all along the line to avoid be-
ing cut up in detail.

If this fails^ or if he has not the time for it, he
will, as has already been seen, have to send in his
infantry. In the typical case, however, there will be
an artillery duel in some form or other, and the
probable result will be that the defense will ulti-
mately have to slacken or cease its fire.

The defense sometimes breaks off the duel pre-
maturely, to induce the enemy to make a premature
assault. So on the last day of Gettysburg, General
Hunt found that he was having difl5culty with his
ammunition supply, and that he was getting no ad-
vantage over the Confederate artillery, which, from
its extended position, could get more guns into action
than he could from his cramped one. He therefore
ceased firing, withdrew part of his guns, replaced
crippled batteries by fresh ones which had not hitherto
been able to find room to come into action, and
waited. The Confederates, deceived by this, launched
Pickett's division to the assault. The Federal bat-
teries at once opened fire with undiminished vigor
upon his infantry, ignoring the Confederate batteries;
the latter, meanwhile, had themselves run short of

125

ammunition, and were unable to support Pickett
with their full force.

Unless something of this kind happens, the in-
fantry will be. getting under way before the duel ap-
proaches an end. The defense can not permit hostile
infantry to maneuver unmolested under his guns,
and so must assign certain batteries to fire upon it ;
he will use as few guns as possible for this purpose,
however, for the enemy's artillery is still the most
important target.

If the attack gains the upper hand in the duel, the
defense must prepare to resist a determined infantry
assault. It may or may not be necessary to move
the batteries to avoid further loss in the meantime ;
but the artillery commanders now employ themselves
in perfecting their dispositions for the next phase of
the fight. Batteries are withdrawn from parts of the
line where they are not likely to be needed, and a
new mobile reserve formed, to be used as before.

The artillery has hitherto been the leader in the
battle. As the attack progresses it begins to come
into action again, Tiot now as the sole, or even the
predominant arm, for it has shown itself unable to
prevent an assault, but to assist the infantry in re-
pelling that assault.

This being the task in hand, the advancing infan-
try will be the principal target ; but it is not yet
time to leave the hostile artillery entirely out of
account. This is now turning a greater or less num-
ber of guns upon the point selected for the attack,
and the defender should try to determine which are
the batteries so directing their fire, and use some of
his own guns against them.

The guns that have withdrawn from the artillery

126

duel ought not to reopen their fire prematurely.
Their target is to be the advancing infantry, and
their object is to assist in repulsing its attack. If
now they open too soon, the hostile artillery, not be-
ing yet urgently needed to protect its own troops
from rifle fire, will be able to return with its whole
power to the guns of the defense, and crush them.
Both the artillery and infantry of the attack can then
unite on. the unsupported infantry. There will have
been two successive efforts at defense, each by only a
part of the force, and each will have been overcome
separately.

For these reasons the artillery should now hold
its fire until the attacking troops come to rifle range.
The guns of the attack will then be forced to divide
their attention between the infantry and artillery,
while at the same time the defender's fire is doubled
in intensity.

It will be a difficult matter to come into action
again, and much will depend upon the care which
has been bestowed upon the preliminary reconnais-
sance. New positions will have to be used. The old
covered emplacements will not usually command the
ground over which the infantry attack is made, and
the guns will have to move up, using direct fire and
little or no concealment. Probably by this time the
old emplacements will have been closely located by
the enemy, so that the advantage of retaining them
is minimized. •

Besides, by coming into action in a new position,
the element of surprise is introduced. A cannonade
from an unexpected quarter, especially if a cross fire
can be brought to bear, should have a stopping power
entirely disproportionate to its volume.

127

As the direction of the attack becomes clearer,
more and more guns should open, until, by the time
it has fully developed, all are in action. And, as the
decisive moment approaches, every gun should fire
upon the infantry alone, neglecting the hostile guns.

Each gun is, as the phrase goes, **its own reserve.'*
That is to say, its maximum rate of fire is seldom
used, and a battery can at almost any time double its
rapidity. But at the crisis of the attack this reserve,
with all others, is thrown in.

If the attack' is repulsed, the defender will usually
try to take the offensive in his turn, and the guns
will act as already indicated for pursuit.

If the attack is successful, a counter attack will be
attempted. In this, the artillery has, first, to hold in
check the hostile batteries and prevent their advanc
ing to the position ; and, secondly, to turn such guns
as it may upon the penetrating infantry. The enemy
will probably press his infantry strongly into the
breach, and if, at the proper moment, a rapid artillery
fire at short range be poured into the flank of this
mass of troops, the effect will be destructive in the
extreme.

This is what happened at the end of the second
battle of Manassas. The right of the Confederate
line was held by Longstreet, the left by Jackson.
The Federal attack, made by Porter's corps, was
directed upon Jackson, who was gradually pushed
back. Porter's left flank was thus exposed to Long-
street ; the enfilade fire of twenty guns broke up the
attack, and enabled the whole Confederate line to
move forward.

When the enemy's success bids fair to be more
than a local one, the commander-in-chief will try to

128

withdraw some of his guns in time to establish a
rallying point in rear. Such as are not ordered back
cover the withdrawal, and continue to make an un-
shaken stand. A withdrawal will be a difficult mat-
ter after the infantry assault is well advanced, and
can be successfully made only if the ground is favor-
able. As for the guns that remain behind, it may be
possible to save them, or a part of them, if a tem-
porary success can be gained; if they are lost, the
loss under such circumstances is to the credit of the
personnel. The old Drill Regulations say, **the loss
of well served guns in the defense of a position, or
in close support of the other arms, is honorable.**

The battle of Koniggratz is a conspicuous example
of this wise prodigality of artillery. The Austrian
batteries lost their guns, but saved the army. One
of the most famous incidents of the battle occurred
when the Prussian infantry, having occupied Chlum,
began to advance beyond it. Captain von Groeben
brought his battery, the Seventh of the Eighth Regi-
ment, into action within 200 paces of the edge of the
village, to enable the other troops to draw off. The
object was accomplished; but the battery lost its cap-
tain, one lieutenant, fifty-two enlisted men and seven
out of its eight guns ; the attack upon it came so
quickly that it succeeded in firing only ten rounds.

On the second day of the battle of Gettysburg, when
it was desired to withdraw four Federal batteries
posted south of the Peach Orchard, one of them. Cap-
tain Bigelows Ninth Massachusetts, was ordered to
cover the movement of the others. This it did, firing
canister until the enemy came literally up to the muz-
zles of the guns. The battery's loss was three officers.

129

twenty-eight men, sixty-five horses and four of its
six guns.

Hohenlohe reports a discussion between two
artillery officers of high rank, as to their experiences
in war ; one finally said to the other, " I have an ad-
vantage over you in one point ; I have lost guns and
you have not."

In covering a retreat, the duties of artillery are
obvious. Its most dangerous enemy is artillery,
especially horse artillery accompanied by cavalry.
Its mission is to gain time, so that order may be re-
stored and a rear guard formed. This it will naturally
do by falling back slowly from position to position,
moving by echelon, and holding the enemy by its
fire whenever possible.

A few words concerning artillery on the march
may well be added here.

Two considerations determine the position of ar-
tillery in an advancing column. It must be near
enough the head to be quickly available when needed,
but not near enough to risk being caught in column
of route by hostile artillery fire.

These requirements evidently need careful bal-
ancing. Under present conditions, artillery caught
in column of route within 4,000 yards of a. hostile
battery would be very roughly handled. The in-
fantry, then, must provide the artillery with a suffi-
cient maneuvering zone to avoid this risk, and a part
of the guns should march as near the head of the
main body as is consistent with this requirement.

As a long column of guns would be very vulner-
able in flank, it should be broken by bodies of in-
fantry placed between units. Many guns will thus
be left far from the front, and the artillery must

130

overcome this disadvantage by being prepared to
cover considerable distances at a rapid gait. Every
effort should be made to clear the roads for it when
it is needed at the front ; the Germans provide for
this by having a special bugle call, "Bear to the right
(or left),'* included in the drill regulations of all arms.
But artillery commanders in rear may themselves
push ahead when -they expect to be needed, without
waiting for orders, going across country if the roads
are not cleared for them. This must of course be
done with judgment, but on many occasions great
results have been obtained through timely pushing
ahead by enterprising artillery commanders. Ho-
henlohe tells how, at St. Privat, he sent an aide to
order up the corps artillery of the Guard, which had
been marching in rear of the First Division. Hardly
had the aide started when he met Colonel von Scher-
bening, the commander of the corps artillery, who at
once reported, to Hohenlohe*s great surprise. This
officer had moved his batteries up at a trot the mo-
ment he heard the first gun, and was able to bring
his whole fifty- four guns into action immediately.

This all applies, of course, to large units of artil-
lery marching with the main body. In a force of
some size, however, a small amount of artillery can,
and generally should, be moved up into the reserve
of the advance guard. Its action there depends upon
the object in view.

Some officers favor its being dispersed widely,
covering as broad a front as possible, with the idea of
deceiving the enemy as to the force and intentions of
the command. Others prefer that it be kept well in
hand, in order to facilitate control over it, and also

131

to allow reinforcing batteries to come into line with
it without mixing tactical units.

If it be necessary to brush aside a weak opposing
force, the advance guard artillery will go in as close
as possible before opening fire ; the advance guard
commander should be pretty certain of his ground
before ordering this, however. If the object is simply
delay, the artillery opens at longer ranges, firing
slowly and holding back the leading elements of the
enemy.

It is hardly an artillery question; but advance
guards and other small detachments are sometimes
tempted to use their guns to gain some little tem-
porary advantage, which results in a positive disad-
vantage to the main force. For instance, when
McClellan, after the Seven Days' Battles, was taking
position at Harrison's Landing, Stuart's artillery com-
mander found a position from which he could reach
part of the Federal camps there. Stuart occupied it
with one gun and a small force of cavalry, and opened
fire without waiting for other troops to come up.
The result was that, a whole Federal division oc-
cupied the position, which had been very lightly
held until then. If Stuart's one gun had not given
the alarm, the Confederate infantry could undoubt-
edly have secured it, and seriously embarrassed Mc-
Clellan.

If there is a probability of a general action fol-
lowing the engagement of the advance guard, the
advance guard artillery should take care so to select
its positions as to facilitate the deployment of the
guns of the main body.

In a retrograde movement, the artillery of the
rear guard has a difficult task, in that it must remain

132

in position long enough to let the main body get on,
but not long enough to become seriously entangled
itself. In general, the rear guard will be stronger in
artillery than an advance guard of the same size ; and
the guns can act only by retiring in echelon from
one position to another. Occasionally they might
get an opportunity for a brilliant success by waiting
in a concealed position well out on a flank ; but such
an undertaking is risky, and could not often be at-
tempted.

The guns of the main body are widely separated
from those of the rear guard, pushing on for posi-
tions in rear. If the commander still hopes to make
a stand, he must get his guns in position somewhere
as soon as possible, and rally his infantry under their
protection ; if he is not in a position to risk a fight, he
has nothing for them to do, and will get them out of
the way as fast as possible, clearing the roads for the
rest of his force.

In a flank guard, mobility is the great essential.
The guns form in two groups, and, if a fight is forced,
take successive positions facing to the flank ; the
group in rear limbers up at the proper moment and
passes the other. This is a dangerous proceeding,
and the route to be followed requires some con-
sideration.

Guns are assigned to an outpost only in a large
force and under exceptional circumstances. They
usually remain with the reserve when so assigned,
but in special cases go farther forward. Such cases
might occur if the outpost were one thrown forward
to hold ground upon which it was intended to fight a
general action ; or if a defile, through which any at-
tack must come, were within range ; or if favorable

133

positions for the enemy's guns were observed beyond
rifle range of the line.

Outpost duty is extremely wearing on artillery,
since the horses have to remain in harness; this
causes rapid deterioration, which no amount of care
can prevent.

134

CHAPTER VII.

EXAMPLES OF MANEUVER AND FIRING PROBLEMS.

No, I, {Fort Leavenworth Map.)

This problem, with solution, was prepared for the
School of the Line, and has already been published
in a series of ** Tactical Studies** used as a text-book
in that school.

Situation :

On June i, 1908, a Blue force at Platte City, Mis-
souri, sends a detachment (consisting of the First
Infantry, Troops "A** and **B,** First Cavalry, and
Battery **B," First Field Artillery, under command
of Colonel B) to reconnoiter in the direction of Easton,
Kansas, where a Red detachment is reported.

About 9 A. M. the main body of the Blue detach-
ment begins crossing the Missouri River bridge at
Fort Leavenworth. When the battery commander^
Captain A, at the head of his battery, reaches the
western bank, his battery agent of communication,^
who has been with the detachment commander at
the head of the support of the advance guard, meets
him and informs him that Colonel B wishes to see
him at once. Turning over the battery to his senior
lieutenant. Captain A rides rapidly forward, accom-
panied by the chief of the fifth section,t one trumpeter

*D. R. F. A. HIT 501-506.

fD. R. F. A. 1[255.

135

and two 'orderlies. The chief of section carries the
battery telescope, and the trumpeter the tripod.

Guided by the agent, Captain A joins Colonel B
at Merritt Hill. Colonel B informs him that accord-
ing to reports from the advance cavalry, a Red force
is on the hill just west of the intersection of Shawnee
and Twentieth Streets, and that it will probably be
necessary to attack.

The battery scouts^ are with the advance cavalry.
The bridge on Farragut Avenue over One Mile
Creek has been destroyed.f

Captain A examines the ground in the vicinity
for a battery position in the event of an engagement.
The ridge on which he is standing (Merritt Hill —
National Cemetery) is in itself a good position, and
can be reached under cover ; but the range is so long,
nearly 4,500 yards, that he looks for a more advanced
position.

Long Ridge is next noticed, and the range from
its crest estimated at 3,500 yards. It is impossible
to find a completely covered way to it, but the ex-
posure would be for a short distance only, and the
battery might possibly not be perceived. If it should
be seen by the enemy, and the latter has any artillery,
he might search the ground behind the ridge; but
the space is so great that he could not guess within
half a mile the exact location of the battery until it
had opened fire.

The hills near the United States Penitentiary

*D. R. F. A. 11498.

fin this study, the tactical employment of the artillery only
will be discussed, the operations of the other arms being outlined
only so far as is necessary to enable the general situation to be
understood.

136

appear to offer several good positions, and^t should
be possible to get within 3,000 yards range somewhere
in that vicinity. The Penitentiary buildings them-
selves increase the facility of finding suitable cover ;
on the other hand they might interfere with observa-
tion of fire. It appears possible to gain the cover of
these hills by way of the bridge (XVIII) over Corral
Creek, seventy-five yards west of the electric railway
trestle. A few hundred yards of the way between
Merritt Hill and this bridge are evidently in plain
sight of the enemy ; but this exposed portion could
be crossed rapidly, and the chances would be small
that the enemy could do any damage during the brief
moments of exposure. After the cover of the hills
south of Corral Creek is once gained, there are so
many places where the battery might go that' the
enemy could not make even a reasonable guess as to
its position until it had opened fire.

Technical considerations incline Captain A to the
short range position. The effect of shrapnel con-
tinues at or near its maximum up to 3,000 yards or so;
but beyond this range it begins to decrease consider-
ably, chiefly because of the increasing angle of fall,
which reduces the space swept by the bullets of each
shrapnel. Errors of the fuze also become more seri-
ous as the range increases. Thus, while work may
be done if necessary at extreme ranges, it is much
more satisfactory, and much more economical in am-
munition, to come to 3,000 yards or thereabouts if
conditions permit. On the other hand, too short a
range is undesirable, as the trajectory is then so flat
that reverse slopes are not effectively searched. It
might be said, roughly, that a range somewhere be-
tween 2,000 and 3,500 yards is most desirable.

137

In the present case, the position near the Peni-
tentiary may be reached with very little more difl&-
culty and exposure than the one at Long Ridge; and
there is no special reason for haste in opening fire,
as it must necessarily be some time before the in-
fantry can get into position to attack.

While Captain A is engaged in these observations,
further reports of the enemy are received by the de-
tachment commander, who decides to attack. Cap-
tain A recommends to him the Penitentiary position
for his artillery.

At 9:40 A. M. Colonel B assembles the oflBcers of
the main body (which is near by on Grant Avenue) at
Merritt Hill, and issues the following verbal orders :

**A hostile force, reported to consist of one bat-
talion of infantry, one troop of cavalry and one bat-
tery of field artillery, occupies that hiir* (pointing to
the one just west of Shawnee and Twentieth Streets).
**Our detachment will attack the enemy, envelop-
ing his left flank.

** Captain A, you will place your battery in a
covered position near the United States Penitentiary,
search for and fire upon the enemy *s artillery, and
later support the infantry attack. Your movement
into position will be covered by infantry from the
advance guard."

*' Major C, you will * ^ ^ *

*' Major D, you will * * ^^^ ^

**The baggage train will ^ ^ ^

**I shall be * ^ ^ ^ *»,

Colonel B also sends a message to the cavalry
commander and another to the commander of the ad-
vance guard (which has been halted on Grant Avenue

138

near. Corral Creek), informing them of the situation
and of his plan of attack, and giving them the neces-
sary orders. In the message to the advance guard
commander, Colonel B includes information as to the
contemplated use of the battery, and instructions for
the advance guard to cover its movement.

Upon receiving his orders, Captain A sends the
following message by one of his orderlies to the bat-
tery:

Merritt Hill,
I June, '08, 9:40 A. M. No. i.
Lieutenant E :

Form and prepare for action,^ and move forward
by route indicated by bearer. Train will remain be-
tween infantry barracks and Merritt Lake. Reservef
will halt just before reaching crest of 'Merritt Hill,
with orders to keep touch with battery and follow it
when it opens fire. Further orders for position of
reserve will be given at Corral Creek when it reaches
there. A,

Capt.

The battery commander, with the chief of section,
trumpeter and remaining orderly, hastens to the
bridge (XVHI) over Corral Creek near the electric
railway trestle, noting as he goes that the ground is
suitable for rapid movement and that the Union
Pacific Railway can be crossed without difficulty.
Passing over the bridge, he advances far enough to
get a view up the ravine which leads from the trestle
toward the Penitentiary, and sees that the battery
can ascend the left bank of this ravine without expos-

*D. R. F.A.ir447.
tD. R. F.A.nr367.

139

ing itself, and reach a position on the slope east of
the Penitentiary. He also notes that the infantry of
the advance guard is moving forward, and by the
time the battery comes up, will be in position to cover
its movement. He sends back his remaining orderly
to meet the battery, show it the best place for cross-
ing the railway, and guide it to this avenue of ap-
proach to the position^ He himself, with the other
two men, moves direct to the position, selecting a
point near the head of the ravine where the battery
can easily cross.

The positions of the flank guns are marked by
stakes, on the sloping ground between the two
branches of the head of the ravine, at about contour
875. The telescope is set up far enough in front of
the line to get a good view, and a little to the left of
the line of fire of the left gun. The tower of the
Staff College at Fort Leavenworth is selected as an
aiming point "^ and the battery commander begins to
prepare his firing data;t as the enemy is not visible,
he takes a prominent tree near the quarry as a rang-
ing target, knowing that he can easily switch his fire
to any point in that vicinity when he so desires.

Meanwhile the battery is coming up. Following
the directions of the battery commander, the orderly
first sent back by Captain A leads it off Grant Avenue
at the south side of Merritt Lake, follows the shore
of the lake and its southern branch until nearly north
of the saddle west of Merritt Hill, and then directs
the battery toward the saddle. As ordered, the re-
serve halts just before reaching that point.

The lieutenant in command keeps the battery at

*D. R. F. A. n[23i.

fD. R. F. A. IT 261.

140

a trot until the saddle is approached. He has learned
from the orderly where the enemy is, and keeps fifty
or a hundred yards ahead of the battery, watching
to see that his advance is covered. Noting that a
mounted man at this point is visible from the enemy's
position, while a dismounted man is not, he slows to
a walk, and dismounts drivers and cannoneers while
crossing, mounting them again on the other side.

Still guided by the orderly, he starts south down
the left bank of the ravine, taking up the trot again.
He soon comes to a point where he can no longer
keep out of sight, and increases the pace as much as
possible. Shelter is again found after going thus for
a few hundred yards, but the trot is kept up wherever
the ground permits.

The other orderly is met near the railway, and he
takes over the duty of guiding the battery, as above
indicated. The battery approaches the line marked
for it (the position of the stakes being indicated by
the trumpeter), turns to the left so as to move along
the line, forms double section column,"^ and unlimbers
to the right.f The rear gun in the column thus be-
comes the right or directing gun.:^

The limbers turn to the left about, clear the bat-
tery, and then move up to the Penitentiary, under
cover of its high walls. They take post close to the
wall, at the eastern end of its northern face. There
is no particular reason why the enemy should fire
upon the Penitentiary with shell ; and even if he
should, the limited number of light shell carried by
an ordinary field battery would hardly be sufficient

*D. R. F. A. ^^ 2IO and 375.
fD. R. F. A. ^il[ 221 and 460.

XD. R. F. A. mni 257-260.

141

to endanger the limbers. In the unlikely event of
danger from this source, they could move northward
down the left bank of the ravine running north from
72, as far as necessary to secure protection.

When the battery opens fire, the reserve, as
ordered, comes up as far as the Corral Creek bridge.
Orders are sent it to cross the bridge and remain
near it under cover. The enemy at this time will be
occupied in searching for the firing battery, and
probably will not even notice the reserve as it crosses
the exposed space, much less fire upon it.

The enemy will naturally be expecting fire from
somewhere in the general neighborhood of the Peni-
tentiary, for he will have seen the battery headed in
that direction. But this will profit him little under
the present conditions. The sheltered area into
which he has seen the battery disappear is very large,
and no clue exists as to the intentions of the battery
commander. Both sides will have to watch for
flashes, shot furrows in the ground, etc., and locate
the target as best they can ; but the Blue battery
commander should have an advantage, in that the
enemy's position is of less extent than his own, so
that the limits of his search are narrower.

Another advantage he should now derive from
the observations of his scouts. Since the advance
cavalry has succeeded in getting good information of
the enemy's general position. Captain A may reason-
ably hope that his own scouts, who have been with
the cavalry, have found out something about the
enemy's guns. If this is the case, one of the scouts
may be expected to join the battery at any moment,
with information which will greatly facilitate the bat-
tery commander's task.

142

Such a use as this of the artillery scouts is not at
all infrequent. In this case the reconnaissance officer
of the battery* did not accompany the scouts ; often
he would do so, and take charge of their work.

Probably the firing data would be complete by
the time the battery reaches the position, and firing
could begin at once. The subsequent course of
action on the part of the battery would depend so
much upon circumstances that it can be indicated
only in a general way.

The artillery forces being equal, the prospect of
silencing the enemy's battery would be only fair;
still there is a chance. In any case it can be kept so
well occupied that it can devote but little attention to
the Blue infantry.

If the enemy's guns can "be partially silenced, the
battery will turn its attention to the Red infantry.
Sooner or later, as the attacking infantry advances,
the defenders must show themselves more or less,
and the battery must keep down the fire of the latter.
The orders given the battery commander leave him
a free hand to manage his fire according to his own
judgment.

The principle by which he will be guided is: "As
a general rule, the fire of artillery is directed against
that arm of the enemy which at the time is predomi-
nant, or which is capable of inflicting the greatest
loss on the infantry or cavalry that the artillery is
supporting.** Applying this principle to the present
case, it will at first be necessary to fire upon the
enemy's artillery; later on, it will become more and
more desirable and necessary to turn upon his in-
fantry.

*D. R. F. A.ir255.

143

Being alone, the battery will then be forced to do
two things at once — keep down artillery fire in one
place and infantry fire in another. This it might do
by assigning a platoon to each target ; a better plan,
however, would be to keep all the fire in the hands
of the battery commander. His means for controll-
ing it are better than those at the disposal of a pla-
toon commander, and the concentrated fire of the
battery is much more effective than the dispersed fire
of the two platoons.

The battery commander can switch his fire upon
the enemy's infantry, whose position is probably not
far enough removed from that of the Red artillery to
render this especially difficult. Then, having the
firing data for both targets, he may distribute his
volleys upon them as he thinks fit.

If the Blue artillery were superior in force to that
of the enemy, a change of position for a part of it
might perhaps be desirable at this stage. Enough
would be left to keep down the hostile battery, and
the rest moved forward, perhaps to Avenue Hill,
where the range would be very short and observation
better.

Having only the one battery, however, the change
would be made only if the position of the enemy's
infantry were such that fire upon it could not be ob-
served. It is of importance that the fire of the
hostile artillery be kept down, and a change of posi-
tion now would make it necessary to range again on
the Red battery. One platoon cannot well be sent,
for then one platoon or the other, on account of lack
of instruments, would be at a disadvantage in using
indirect fire; and the chances would be against its
accomplishing much by direct fire, since the Red bat-

144

tery in all probability would not have been seri-
ously damaged before that time, and from its covered
position would turn its attention to the one exposed
platoon. The situation would be reduced to this:
equal forces, but one battery concentrated and con-
cealed, the other dispersed and partially exposed.
There could be but one result.

If a change of position is found to be necessary^
it must be made with the utmost rapidity. The bat-
tery commander or his reconnaissance officer should
go forward, select a new position and begin to pre-
pare firing data, the battery meanwhile continuing
in action ; then, at a favorable moment, the battery
would quickly change position and resume firing.

It will be noted that the occupation of the first
position is of the simplest nature ; that is, the battery
is so placed that it can limber quickly and easily, and
can move out without embarrassment, and the bat-
tery commander is so close to his guns that no tele-
phone lines are necessary. Furthermore, the posi-
tion selected is such that, if desired, the guns may be
quickly run up to the crest for direct fire. All these
things are very desirable when a battery is operating
alone ; this is the time of all times when it is im-
portant for it to retain its mobility to the greatest
extent.

In this case there appears to be a considerable pre-
ponderance in infantry on the Blue side, and the at-
tack will probably succeed. The main attack will
come up from the left of the Blue battery. The
latter will then, when the attacking infantry ap-
proaches the area covered by its fire, sweep the line
of Shawnee Street west of the quarry. Thus, if the
enemy attempts to withdraw or to reinforce his line

145

by way of the south, the Blue infantry will be in
position to take the movement in flank ; if by way of
the west, the artillery fire will cause loss and con-
fusion in that quarter.

As soon as it appears that the attack has been
successful, the detachment commander will doubtless
send for the battery to assist in holding the captured
position. Should no orders come, the battery com-
mander should move up on his own responsibility.
If the enemy withdraws before the final assault, the
battery should move up in like manner, come into
action supported by the most advanced cavalry or
infantry, according to circumstances, and fire on the
retreating column. In either case, the advance
should be made with the utmost celerity.

In the event of reinforcements reaching the
enemy and the attack being repulsed, it will become
the duty of the artillery to cover the retreat across
the Missouri. It should, as a first move, withdraw
to the Merritt Hill ridge, fire upon the most advanced
closed bodies of pursuing troops, and particularly
attempt to prevent hostile artillery from reaching a
point from which it could command the Fort Leaven-
worth bridge.

Throughout the action outlined above, shrapnel
only would be used. Against the infantry, of course,
shell would not be considered, as any intrenchments
would be hasty and light ; and against the artillery,
no effect upon materiel would be looked for under
these circumstances, the effect being merely to make
the personnel keep under cover.

146

No. 2. {Fort Leavenworth Map.)

This problem is one given to the student officers
of the School of the Line, to be solved in the field as
indicated.

Situation.

A small mixed force (Brown) is retiring through
Fort Leavenworth toward the southwest. A Blue
force (one regiment infantry, one troop cavalry, one
field battery) is following closely.

The battery is moving west on Pope Avenue,
head of column at Thomas Avenue, when hostile
artillery opens fire upon Blue infantry crossing the
Cavalry Drill Ground; and almost immediately the
battery commander receives orders to engage the
enemy's guns, which appear to be posted in the
orchard east of the Federal Penitentiary.

Required.

1. A sketch of the position selected, showing
each element of the firing battery and the battery
commander's station. Draw lines from the latter
point in the direction of the target, and of the aim-
ing point if one is used, and note estimated distances
to both.

2. Discussion of position, giving reasons for its
selection.

3. Description of route followed in moving into
position ; of the formations used ; and of the exact
location of each element of the battery, including
firing battery, reserve, train, battery commander's
station, and aiming point if used.

147

Nos, J, ^, 5. {Fort Riley Map,)

These and the remaining problems have been
selected from those used in the instruction of artillery-
concentrated in an instruction camp at Fort Riley.
These three form a connected series, covering three
days' work. Note the manner of assigning duties to
the diflFerent battalions in Nos. 4 and 5.

No. 3.

General Situation,

A Brown division (organized as in the Field
Service Regulations, except that the artillery con-
sists of one regiment field artillery, two batteries,
horse artillery, and two batteries siege artillery) is
ordered to cross the Republican River at Junction
City, and move upon the enemy, reported in the
direction of Garrison.

Special Situation, (Horse Artillery.)

On the morning of the first day, the divisional
cavalry regiment and the horse artillery battalion
crossed the river at Junction City. At 9 A. M. the
artillery and the Third Squadron are on the Gov-
ernor Harvey Road, head of column at Milford Road,
when the artillery commander receives the following
verbal orders.

Orders,

The enemy's cavalry (four squadrons) is arriving
at Hill 1332. Put your guns in position to attack his
right. The Third Squadron will accompany you.
The First and Second Squadrons will attack mounted,
from the woods at the western end of Pump House
Canon, as soon as you open fire.

148

No. 4..

General Situation, — As in No. 3.

Special Situation, — (All artillery.)

The cavalry and horse artillery succeeded in
driving the enemy back to the line Estes — Morris Hill,
but here he received reinforcements and they were
unable to drive him farther.

On the morning of the second day's operations, a
part of the enemy's infantry and artillery began
occupying the line Estes — Morris Hill. Early on the
same morning our main body began crossing the
river. The division commander decides to attack.

The artillery commander sends messages as fol-
lows, based on the division orders. (Note. — When
these orders are issued, the artillery is on the Gov-
ernor Harvey Road, head of column at Milford Road.)

To Commanding Officer First Battalion :

The enemy's cavalry has appeared at Hill 1332,
but has been driven back upon the line Estes — Morris
Hill. His infantry and artillery are on that line.

Place your battalion in a covered position near
the east end of Sherman Heights, and open fire upon
any formed bodies of the enemy within a sector of
600 mils, west from and including Morris Hill.
Silence promptly any artillery discovered within your
sector. You will be supported by infantry.

To Commanding Officer Second Battalion:

(First paragraph as in message to First Battalion.)

Place your battalion in a covered position near

the west end of Sherman Heights, and open fire

upon any formed bodies of the enemy within a sector

149

from Hill 1332 to and including the hill on Estes
Road, due north of the target range.

Our cavalry and horse artillery will be operating
west of Hill 1332. You will be supported by in-
fantry.

To Commanding Officer Siege Battalion:

(First paragraph as in message to First Battalion.)
Place your battalion in a covered position near
the reservoir, and open fire upon any formed bodies
of the enemy, from and including Morris Hill east to
Forsyth Drive. Silence promptly any artillery dis-
covered within your sector. You will be supported
by infantry.

To Cofnmanding Officer Horse Battalion:

The enemy is taking position along the line
Estes — Morris Hill. Our cavalry is to move against
Estes Gate, to guard against any movement of the
enemy upon our left flank.

Move forward and take position near Hill 1332,
west of the Governor Harvey Road ; open fire upon
any formed bodies of the enemy near that or the
Estes Road. Your present escort accompanies you.

No. 5.

General Situation. — As in No. 3.

Special Situation,

During the second day the enemy withdrew to
the line Estes— Forsyth Hill— Saddleback. The de-
ployment of both forces was completed.

The division commander intends to attack the
enemy's left in the vicinity of Saddleback. To as-
sist in carrying out this attack the artillery com-

150

mander issues orders as follows. (Note. — Battalions
will take up positions occupied, by them on the
second day, and there await orders.)

To Commanding Officer First Battalion:

The enemy, one division, occupies a line Estes —
Forsyth Hill — Saddleback. Our infantry is about to
attack at Saddleback.

Advance to a covered position at Morris Hill, and
open fire upon the enemy within a sector of 2 5omils^
commencing lOO mils west of the Saddleback monu-
ment and extending west.

To Commanding Officer Second Battalion:

(First paragraph as in First Battalion orders.)
Advance to a covered position on Estes Road»

west of Morris Hill, and open fire upon the enemy

within the sector of 300 mils extending west from

the Milk Ranch Road.

To Cofnmanding Officer Siege Battalion:

(First paragraph as in First Battalion orders.)
Advance to a covered position east of Morris Hill^
and open fire upon the Saddleback, covering a front
of 300 yards on each side of the monument.

To Commanding Officer Horse Battalion:

(First paragraph as in First battalion orders.)
Advance to a covered position at Hill 1332, and

keep down the enemy^s fire from Forsyth Hill to the

Milk Ranch Road.

151

No, 6, {Fort Riley Map,)

For the purposes of this problem, one battalion of
the regiment was placed on a war footing by assign-
ments of men, horses and materiel from the other,
and a section of an ammunition column was formed
with caissons from the horse batteries.

General Situation,

The Smoky Hill and Kansas Rivers form the
boundary between two hostile States, Brown to south
and Blue to north.

The Brown army, intending to invade northern
territory, has sent a force consisting of two regiments
of cavalry and one brigade of infantry, to seize Junc-
tion City and the crossings over the Republican
River. This force has accomplished its purpose and
established railhead at Junction City, when, on the
night before the commencement of the exercise, it is
learned that the enemy is advancing. The general
officer commanding asks for artillery.

Special Situation,

At 9:30 A. M. a battalion of field artillery, with a
portion of an ammunition column, has reached Junc-
tion City and detrained. The battalion commander
learns that the Brown force is holding the line of
hills north of the Republican Flats, and that it is
confronted by a Blue force on the line Estes Gate —
Morris Hill.

(Note. — The battalion, followed by the ammuni-
tion section, will proceed to Junction City by the
direct road. It- will there receive orders.)

152

Message.

To Commanding Officer Artillery Battalion:

The enemy holds the line Estes Gate — Morris
Hill. This force holds the hills north of the Repub-
lican Flats.

Move your battalion to a covered position near
the Governor Harvey Road. Further orders will be
sent you on arrival. Your ammunition column will
remain at Junction City,

Memorandum of Execution of Problem,

Upon reaching position indicated in orders, the
battalion commander will have pointed out to him
the location of two batteries of artillery near Hay-
makers* Camp. He will be told to take position and
open fire upon these two batteries, bearing in mind
the necessity for being prepared to turn a part or the
whole of his fire upon Morris Hill. Replacement of
ammunition from fifth section in each battery. He
will later be told that part of our infantry will attack
Morris Hill from the direction of Pump House Canon;
the artillery is to prepare this attack. Replacement
of ammunition from limbers in each battery.

Later he will be told that the infantry is making
the attack, but is meeting severe loss from fire from
the hill about 800 yards west of Morris Hill. He
will direct the fire of all his guns upon this hill.
Use of auxiliary observers, reporting assumed effect
of fire by telephone.

After this, he will be told to have lunch. After
lunch he will replenish ammunition of firing bat-
teries, fifth sections being'^replaced by sixth.

He will next be told to prepare the sector from